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RESOURCE DEPRIVATION AND THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
JOE MARGULIES*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If the state passed a statute prohibiting defense counsel from
attending arraignments, requiring representation of multiple defendants by a single counsel, and preventing pretrial investigation,
the statute would be struck down. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held as much.'
Our certainty that such a statute is unconstitutional is not in the
least shaken by the knowledge that some defendants, despite such a
statute, would be acquitted at trial. A law violates the sixth amendment long before it guarantees a conviction for every defendant.
The constitutional flaw in such a statute is not that it will predetermine every outcome, but that it will taint every trial, such that we
have no confidence in any given outcome. In these cases, relief
comes in the form of a per se rule of reversal, without regard to the
facts in a particular case, and independent of whether the defendant
2
can show prejudice.
* StaffAttorney, Texas Resource Center, Austin, Texas;J.D., Northwestern University; B.A., Cornell University.
1 In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961), the Court recognized that arraignment "is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding" where available defenses may be
irretrievably lost "if not then and there asserted ....
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475,484 (1978), the Court observed that the multiple representation of clients with
conflicting interests deprives defendants of "the guarantee of 'assistance of counsel.' "
"[I]n a case ofjoint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeatingis in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but
also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process." Id. at 490
(emphasis in original). In addition, in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940), the
Court wrote:
[The denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the
accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into
a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.
This dicta in Avery has been more recently reaffirmed. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365 (1986).
2 The one qualification to this is the harmless error doctrine. As argued elsewhere,
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Now suppose the state passes another statute that produces the
same effect, but without the positive prohibitions of the first statute.
That is, suppose the state designates a set of attorneys to represent
all indigent defendants in the jurisdiction, but at the same time refuses to provide adequate funding. On the average, each attorney
will represent well over 500 defendants at any given time. The office has no investigators, nominal support staff, and no money for
expert witnesses. In fact, suppose the state provides just enough
funding so these attorneys can do nothing more than appear at
those proceedings to which they are entitled to appear. Time spent
preparing for any particular proceeding is, necessarily, time taken
away from an appearance. Time spent investigating, for example,
means that the attorney cannot attend proceedings. Time spent
conferring with clients may mean no legal research. In short, the
statute guarantees nothing more than the right to a body beside the
defendant-counsel only by the accident of having passed the local
bar exam.
Just as with the first statute, one can be confident that some
defendants prosecuted under this regime will be acquitted. Many,
however, will no doubt be convicted. The question immediately
arises, then, of how to analyze this problem-the problem of systemic resource deprivation.
On the one hand, there are obvious similarities between the regime created by resource deprivation and the regime created by direct statutory prohibitions. One accomplishes directly what the
other achieves indirectly, but both lead to the same result. It is the
result which causes the injury to the defendant, and in that respect
the two are precisely the same.
On the other hand, there are equally obvious similarities between the resource poor counsel and the incompetent counsel.
Both often create the same trial record, so for the reviewing court,
the two are indistinguishable. The explanation for a failure to inveshowever, harmless error has no application to the problem of systemic resource deprivation. A constitutional violation is subject to harmless error analysis only when its scope
can be readily identified and its effect isolated from the remainder of the proceeding.
See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
490-91 (1978). Systemic resource deprivation cannot be so easily contained: "[t]he insidiousness of overburdening defense counsel is that it can result in concealing from the
courts, and particularly the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that is
done to defendants." State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 362, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1984).
See infra notes 190 through 200 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the federal harmless error standard presumes prejudice to the defendant. The question is whether the
state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of prejudice, or that the error had
no effect on the outcome. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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tigate, 3 or a failure to object to inadmissible evidence, 4 cannot be
determined by reference to the record alone. Moreover, a defendant who alleges ineffective assistance because of attorney errors
must demonstrate actual prejudice in the outcome of the trial.5 Relief is limited to the individual case and establishes no per se rule.
After the comparison, the question of how to analyze the impact
of resource deprivation in indigent defense remains. That is the
6
topic of this Article.
The Article contains three parts. The first part briefly inS See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986).

5 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692-93. One qualification to this rule is United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
6 The notion that a court could compel a governmental body to raise funding of
public defenders' offices is certain to triggei discordant views. Decisions about the allocation of public funds reside classically in the legislative domain. Some may argue
that-without exception-it is up to elected officials to debate, bargain, and conclude
who deserves what.
The sixth amendment, however, guarantees a certain quality of representation; expenditures for the defense of indigent defendants therefore transcend the purely legislative domain. It is a court's duty to determine when, for instance, a public defenders'
office has too many cases and too few resources to provide representation that satisfies
the sixth amendment.
Concern over the court's role is common to most, if not all, institutional litigation.
Sometimes also labeled public law litigation, these lawsuits challenge the systemic violation of constitutional norms by social institutions. Based on such claims, courts have
grappled with attacks relating to, for instance, the following: reapportionment, Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); school desegregation,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267 (1977); prison conditions, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); juvenile
detention, Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 640
(5th Cir. 1973); and police practices, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
Challenging social institutions in the courts has spawned considerable scholarly debate. Most of this literature addresses the policy questions noted above. This Article
does not seek to add to or review this debate, except to the inevitable extent that proposing a new systemic challenge fuels the controversy. Rather, this Article concerns the
related, and arguably more fundamental question of whether a systemic challenge to
resource deprivation in representation of indigent defendants is viable under the sixth
amendment. The following articles discuss the policy questions: 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL
RIGHrs INJUNCTION (1978); Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976); Diver, The Judge as -PoliticalPowerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies andJudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE LJ. 635 (1982); Frug, TheJudicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Special Project, The Remedial Process in
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Note, Implementation Problems
in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977).
Given the extensive body of literature, of which this is only a sample, it is noteworthy that so little attention has been given to institutional litigation in indigent defense.
But see Mounts, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE

221 (1986).
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troduces the problem of resource deprivation in the defense of the
criminally accused. The second part analyzes the right to effective
assistance of counsel. The Article will demonstrate in this part that
all right to counsel jurisprudence protects the same interest-the
right of the accused to a fair trial. A defendant may be denied this
right because either the state failed to provide counsel, the state interfered with the attorney-client relationship, counsel was incompetent, or counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. Yet in
all cases, the cornerstone of the analysis is whether the defendant
received a fair trial. If he or she did, the inquiry ends and no right
to counsel violation has been stated.
When the Court writes of a "fair trial," in the context of right to
counsel jurisprudence, it means one of two things. In one line of
cases, fairness is a product of procedural rigor. A trial is fair when
counsel is able to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial
testing. Defects which undermine, or threaten to undermine, the
adequacy or integrity of the adversarial fact-finding process violate
the right to counsel and must be removed. 7 In a second line of
cases, the focus shifts to the result: a trial is fair if the result is
"just"-the person convicted is in fact guilty. Procedural irregularity in these cases, while important, justifies relief only if the defendant can prove his or her innocence. 8
The explanation for this division in right to counsel cases is the
difference between system and attorney ineffectiveness. In the former, the trial is unfair because of systemic conditions operating
apart from either the performance of individual counsel or the facts
of particular cases. Relief in these cases is systemic and targeted at
the offending condition. In the latter cases, however, unfairness is a
product of attorney incompetence. Thus, the system separate from
counsel is presumed to have operated correctly. Relief reaches only
the individual case, since by definition nothing else is wrong.
Finally, the third part of the Article turns from theory to practice. The possible applications of a claim of ineffective assistance
caused by resource deprivation are numerous; the implications are
enormous. Surprisingly, few cases have considered the question in
detail, and they unfortunately fail to distinguish clearly between attorney and system ineffectiveness. This confuses rather than clarifies the law. This Article is an attempt to shed some light on that
confusion.
7 See infra notes 89 through 115 and accompanying text.

8 See infra notes 116 through 142 and accompanying text.
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THE PROBLEM

Repeated studies have documented some of the inadequacies in
indigent defense. 9 As one scholar correctly observed, oppressive
workloads are the single greatest systemic obstacle to effective representation.10 The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals estimates that the maximum effective
felony caseload per attorney per year is 150 cases." Public defender directors say a more likely estimate is 100 cases per attorney
per year.' 2 The District of Columbia Public Defender Service tries
to impose an annual limit of 40 cases per year, of which 20 are open
13
at any one time.
Against these aspirations are the realities. In 1975, one researcher reported that New York defenders carried on average a
caseload of 922 cases per year. In Philadelphia, the average
caseload was 600 to 800 cases per year, and in Oakland, the average
9 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING
(1982); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCITION, THE OTHER FACE OFJUSTICE
(1973) (hereinafter NLADA); N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR:
METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (1982); Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on
Defense Services, 12 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 667 (1975).
The effect of the most significant inadequacy-too many cases-has not escaped the
notice of the courts:
[T]rial counsel testified that although she was aware of several issues regarding the
admissibility of certain physical and testimonial evidence, she conducted no legal
research and made no objections to its introduction. She further testified that
within a few months after petitioner's conviction, she collapsed in court, her health
"seriously threatened" by a caseload of approximately 2,000 cases per year. She
then resigned from the Public Defender's Office, having come to the conclusion that
she was "actually doing the defendants more harm by just presenting a live body
than if they had no representation at all."
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1163 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977), modified, 586 F.2d 1325
(9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). See Thomas v. State, 251
Ind. 546, 556-57, 242 N.E.2d 919, 925 (1969) (emphasis added), which states:
[W]e do not hold or intend to imply that the public defender was incompetent or
acted in an improper manner. Confronted with twice the normal case load, he may
well have done all that he possibly had time to do for the appellant. If he did so, he
properly performed the duties of his office. On the other hand, the appellant's
rights can not (sic) be determined by the case load of the public defender. It is
reversible error not to provide a defendant... with adequaterepresentationat each stage of the
proceeding, regardless of the circumstances which cause the public defender's office to become overloaded. If the public defender was too busy to adequately represent each of his clients, the court should have appointed other counsel to assist him in carrying out his
responsibilities.
10 Mounts, supra note 6 at 224 n.13. Systemic here means unrelated to the failings of
any particular counsel. The idea of a system ineffectiveness, as opposed to attorney
ineffectiveness, is developed more fully in the following section.
11 NLADA, supra note 9, at 29.
12 Id.
13 An Exemplary Project: The Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia, 14 (1974).
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was 300.14 In Minneapolis, the average caseload in felony and misdemeanor court has increased thirty percent in the last two years,
and 100% since 1981.15 In San Francisco County between 1983

and 1984, public defenders experienced a thirty-five percent increase in caseload per attorney. In Los Angeles County over the
16
same period, the increase was twenty-eight percent.
Excessive caseloads stem from the well-documented problem of

chronic underfunding in criminal defense agencies. 17 After a comprehensive three year study, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants reported on the problem of un-

derfunding in criminal defense:
Overall, there is abundant evidence in this report that defense services
for the poor are inadequately funded. As a result, millions of persons
in the United States who have a constitutional right to counsel are denied effective legal representation. Sometimes defendants are inadequately represented: other times . . .no lawyer is provided or a
constitutionally defective waiver is accepted by the court. Defendants
suffer quite directly, and the criminal justice system functions inefficiently .... 18

Inadequate funding forces appointed counsel to ration his or
her time, which inevitably compromises his or her ability to prepare
14 Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179 (1975).
15 The problem of excessive workload has found mention in cases. See, e.g., O'Berry
denied, 433 U.S.
v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, reh'g denied, 549 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.), cert.
911 (1977) ("oppressive caseloads in public defender offices"); Greenfield v. Gunn, 556
F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977) (same); Gaglie v. Ulibarri, 507 F.2d
721 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd on
rehearing,586 F.2d 1325 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (2000 cases per year for
attorney in felony court). The figures for Minneapolis are based on personal conversations with current defenders in the Hennepin County Office of the Public Defender.
16 Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 473, 488, n.66.
17 Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the ConstitutionalRight
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 625, 658-60, nn. 189-92. See,
e.g., ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, REPORT ON
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY (1980) (office "woefully underfunded"); BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1978) ("insufficient funding is the major problem in providing effective representation for indigent defendants"); OHIO PUBLIC
DEFENDER COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE REPRESENTATION AFFORDED INDIGENT PERSONS

IN FELONY CASES (1982) (same); see also Mounts, supra note 16, at 483 ("almost every

study made of defender programs has noted very serious shortcomings that are traceable directly to lack of funds").
18 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 17. See also N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 2;
NLADA, supra note 9, at 77 ("[T]he lack of adequate financial and manpower resources
has seriously crippled the attempts ... to provide truly effective representation. The
financial inability of local governmental units to supply indigent defense services ... has
resulted in vast disparities in the scope and quality of representation provided for indigent felony defendants.").
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the case.' 9 The inability to prepare adequately for upcoming cases
is likewise well documented. 20 In one study of Cook County, Illinois
trial attorneys, subjects were asked to evaluate the competency of
other trial lawyers. Lack of preparation was the most common complaint of over half of the responding attorneys. 2' Yet thorough
preparation is generally recognized as the sine qua non of effective
advocacy. 2 2 In fact, the appeal most likely to succeed in an ineffective assistance claim is failure of counsel to investigate and call de23
fense witnesses.
Failure to prepare affects every stage of the defense case. At
each point where the attorney must rely on his or her expertise, a
failure to prepare defeats his or her ability to test the adequacy of
the state's case. Studies have documented some of the practices
which follow from the chronic shortage of resources: attorneys conducting cross-examination of police officers at preliminary hearings
without prior opportunity to study police reports; lack of funding to
hire experts and investigators; minimal use of pretrial discovery;
24
and incomplete or inadequate training.
Some of the more appalling defense conditions were documented in the exhaustive study by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA). 25 The study researched the
availability of investigative support in defender offices. As explained above, fact investigation is an essential part of case preparation.26 But despite the absolutely crucial nature of investigation, the
19 See Klein, supra note 17, at 663 n.212 for catalog of studies correlating "caseload
pressures ... with inadequate preparation time."
20 Id. at 664 n.216.
21 Maddi, Improving Trial Advocacy: The Views of Trial Attorneys, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
REs.J. 1049, 1071-72.
22 Klein, supra note 17, at 663, 664 (collecting commentary on the importance of

preparation in the defense of criminal cases).
23 See In re Snyder, 734 F.2d. 334, 340 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 472 U.S. 634 (1985); United
States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982); Levine, PreventingDefense Counsel Error-An
Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Their Implications for Professional
Regulation, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 1275 (1984) (most common allegation to support claim of
ineffective assistance was failure to investigate); Note, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 299, 304 (1973) (appeal pressing lack of pretrial investigation and preparation

warrants reversal for ineffective assistance more than any other claim).
24 Klein, supra note 17, at 662 nn.203-10.
25 NLADA, supra note 9, at 14.
26 Underscoring the importance of investigation, some of the pre-Stricklanddecisions

suggested that ineffective assistance may be presumed when an attorney has failed to
interview potentially crucial witnesses. Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982); Marrow v. Parrot, 574 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); see also
Klein, supra note 17, at 665 nn.221-22. While these cases may have been decided differently after 1984, the point remains that investigation is crucial to the ability to test effectively the adequacy of the state's case.
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NLADA reported that sixty percent of all defenders who responded
to the survey did not have the assistance of full-time staff investigators, and eighty-three percent of all individual defenders had no
staff investigators at all. 2 7 Over twenty-five percent of the defenders
who did not have staff investigators also reported that they could
not get expenses for investigators from the court.28 Most attorneys
felt that one investigator could adequately serve no more than three
attorneys. Yet the study also reported that the average investigator
to attorney ratio was well past 1 to 3.29
It is difficult to imagine effective representation without adequate fact investigation. Yet it is impossible to conceive of effective
representation where no lawyer is present. 30 The NLADA study
also documented the fraction of cases where attorneys were absent
from proceedings where they were entitled to be. For instance, only
twenty percent of the defenders practicing in rural and urban areas
estimated they were always present to cover proceedings at which
bail is set. 3 ' A full thirty percent in urban areas and forty percent in
rural areas reported they never, or at best not often, covered bail
hearings.3 2 On average, only one in ten defenders reported they
always covered lineups. In urban areas, twenty percent of the attorneys, and in rural areas thirty-five percent, never cover lineups. 33
Only seventy percent of the rural attorneys reported they were al34
ways able to cover arraignments.
27 NLADA, supra note 9, at 21.
28 Id.
29 Id. Can one investigator adequately serve three attorneys with full felony
caseloads? An attorney with 30 to 40 active felonies should easily occupy one full time
investigator.
30 "In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
[Tioday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities ... our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to
"critical" stages of the proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
31 NLADA, supra note 9, at 25. Urban is defined as a population from 50,001 to
500,000; rural is defined as a population less than 50,000. Id. at 13. The figures are
somewhat better for defenders in metropolitan areas (defined as an area with a population over 500,000), where 80% of the reporting defenders estimate they always cover
bail hearings.
32 Id.
33 Id. Again, the figures are slightly better for metropolitan areas, where only 10% of
the attorneys said they never cover lineups, but where 40% reported that they were not
often present for lineups. Id.
34 Id. Though the NLADA study is now 15 years old, more recent research indicates
that conditions remain inadequate. For instance, Professor Klein discusses some of the
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By contrast, prosecutors endure none of the hardships of defenders. Prosecutors receive almost four times more funding from
state and local governments than do defenders.3 5 Funding for representation of indigent defense is less than three percent of all criminal justice spending nationwide.3 6 The NLADA reported that
attorney salaries in sixty-three percent of all defender offices were
lower than prosecutor salaries, and in only three percent of the offices was the relation reversed. 3 7 In addition, the support services
essential to the preparation of the prosecutor's case-police investigation, FBI and local crime labs, and state and local forensic experts-are not paid for by the prosecutor's office. 38 The analogous
39
expenses, however, generally are incurred by'defenders.
In sum, defenders nationwide regularly find themselves overworked, underpaid, understaffed, and out-resourced. A fair trial
studies documenting office-wide violations of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). In one study of the Tennessee system, the report concluded that attorneys were
not assigned at all in misdeameanor cases, and defendants were forced to proceed pro
se. Klein, supra note 17, at 659-60 nn.191-93. As recently as 1984, the author spoke
with defenders who described appointment practices in rural counties in Arkansas. According to them, it is not unusual for a suspect to be arraigned and a plea entered before
counsel is appointed.
35 Klein, supra note 17, at 675 (citing UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1980
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 11 (1981)).
36 Id. at 675 n.267 (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS 7 (1984)).
37 NLADA, supra note 9, at 20-21. The NLADA also reported average starting salaries for defenders. Over half of the reporting offices paid a starting salary of less than
$11,000. This includes offices employing part-time attorneys. Of those offices which
employ only full-time attorneys, over half reported a starting salary between $11,000
and $13,999. Of course, the figures are for a report written in 1973. But even assuming
100% inflation, the average salary for these defenders would still be between $22,000
and $28,000. At least for some major cities, this estimate does not seem far off: in 1984,
the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C. started its attorneys at $24,000. In
1985, the Minneapolis Public Defender started its attorneys at $26,000. In 1987, The
Legal Aid Society in New York City started its defenders at $28,000.
38 Klein, supra note 17, at 675-76.
39 The inequality caused by pitting the layman against the professional prosecutor
figured prominently in the early decisions on the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (The sixth amendment
"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal
with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere
deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society.").
If the disparity between prosecution and the "average defendant" can form the basis for a sixth amendment violation, then by implication, the disparity between the state
and the "average defendant" represented by counsel so overburdened as to be constructively absent must likewise be a sixth amendment violation.
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presumes diligent advocacy-something other than a live body-by
defense counsel. But in jurisdictions across the country, diligent advocacy is no more than an aspiration.
III.
A.

THE RIGHT To THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

Nearly two decades ago, Justice Black in his concurring opinion
in Coleman v. Alabama40 wrote:
I fear that the prevailing opinion seems at times to proceed on the
premise that the constitutional principle ultimately at stake here is not
the defendant's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments but rather a right to a "fair trial" as conceived by
judges. While that phrase is an appealing one, neither the Bill of
Rights nor any other part of the Constitution contains it.... The explicit commands of the Constitution provide a full description of the
kind of "fair trial" the Constitution guarantees, and in my judgment
that document leaves no room for judges either to add or detract from
these commands.
Despite its intuitive appeal, this view has not prevailed. The
right to counsel embraces a number of protections: the right to representation in any criminal proceeding which may lead to incarceration;4 1 the right to be free from governmental interference in the
attorney-client relationship; 4 2 the right to representation at all "critical stages" of the prosecution; 43 the right to be free from representation by counsel laboring under an actual conflict of interest; 4 4 and
the right to competent defense counsel. 4 5 In all of these cases, the
central inquiry is whether the defendant received a "fair trial." If he
or she did, the inquiry ends, for no violation has been stated. 4 6
40 399 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1970).
41 See Argersinger v. Hamlin,

407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
42 See Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct 594 (1989); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80
(1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605
(1972); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
43 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
44 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978).
45 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648 (1984).
46 For example, see United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1980), in which
the Court stated:
The premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional infringement identified has
had or threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation ....

Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis
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The premier right to counsel decision, and the case upon which
47
all right to counsel jurisprudence builds, is Powell v. Alabama. Powell established the right to representation by counsel in capital cases.
The holding is so firmly rooted in the American sense of fairness
48
that we must remind ourselves the decision was not unanimous.
The condition under attack in Powell was the "casual fashion" in
which counsel was appointed for seven black youths accused of raping two white girls. Until the morning of the trial, the trial court had
"appointed all the members of the [Scottsboro] bar" for the limited
"purpose of arraigning the defendants." 49 Whether counsel would
appear to represent the defendants at trial was left unsettled.
The Court rejected this practice as a denial of the right to counsel. Because the assistance of counsel was a "necessary incident of a
fair trial," permitting the trial to go forward without counsel-or
with the counsel "appointed" in this case-made a mockery of the
adversarial process. 50 Justice Sutherland's now familiar passage described the effects of a trial without the "guiding hand of counsel":
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.... Without...
[the assistance of counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. 5 1
This passage, perhaps more than any other in any decision of the
Court, has been invoked to support what quickly became the less
eloquent statement of the rule: the sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel protects the defendant's right to a fair trial.
An excellent illustration of this appears in Gideon v. Wainwright,5 2 which established the right to counsel in felony prosecutions. The Court in Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady, 53 which had held
that the right to counsel in felony cases is not a fundamental right
for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial.
See also, Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. at 600 (1989).
47 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Justice Stevens recently described Powell as the "fountainhead" for all right to counsel jurisprudence. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S.Ct. 2765,
2774 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds).
48 Powell, 287 U.S. at 73. The Court split 7-2 to reverse the Alabama Supreme Court,
with Justice McReynolds concurring in the dissent of Justice Butler.
49 Id. at 56.
50 Id. at 71.

51 Id. at 68-69.
52 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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essential to a fair trial. 5 4 Under Betts, the refusal to appoint counsel

was to be judged on a case-by-case basis. 55 In rejecting it, the Court
reviewed a number of earlier precedents, most notably Powell, and
concluded:
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth.... The right of one charged with crime to counsel may
not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some coun56
tries, but it is in ours.

The "assistance" envisioned in Powell begins to take form in the
"critical stage" cases. That is, to recognize the right to counsel, but
restrict its scope by narrowing its application, would make Powell a
nullity.5 7 To that end, the Court has long recognized that the sixth
amendment right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. 58 Early cases in this line defined the "critical
stage" as the point at which rights are irrevocably lost if not then
and there asserted. 59 Subsequently, the Court altered the definition
60
to the point at which the state initiates adversary proceedings.
The Court has also modified the doctrine to look beyond whether
defenses would de jure be lost. Now, the inquiry is whether de54

Id. at 465.
55 Id. at 462. As the Court recently recognized, Betts was the only right to counsel
decision to adopt a case-by-case approach. All other decisions, including Gideon in replacing Betts, proceed as categorical mandates: once the violation has been established,
the Court categorically bars its return. See, e.g., Murray v. Giaratanno, 109 S. Ct. 2765,
2771 (1989); Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600 (1989). See also Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 867-68 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which the Court stated:
[O]nce we have determined that a particular right should be incorporated against
the States, we have abandoned case-by-case considerations of fairness. Incorporation, in effect, results in the establishment of a strict prophylactic rule, one which is
to be generally observed in every case regardless of its particular circumstances. It
is a judgment on the part of this Court that the probability of unfairness in the
absence of a particular right is so great that denigration of the right will not be
countenanced under any circumstances.
56 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
57 See supra note 1 for a relevant statement by the Avery Court.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967), in which the Court
stated:
[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth
Amendment [right to counsel] guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the
proceedings.
59 See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (preliminary hearing in a capital case a critical stage); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (arraignment in a
capital case a critical stage).
60 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972).
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fenses would de facto be eliminated or curtailed if counsel were not
present. 6' The rationale behind all critical stage cases, however, is
the same: once the prosecution has reached a certain point, the
right to counsel must attach in order to protect the underlying right
62
to a fair trial.
The premier example of this principle appears in United States v.
Wade. 63 In Wade, the Court held that a post-indictment pretrial
lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution. The defendant was
therefore "'as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] ... as at the
trial itself.' "64 In its analysis, the Court in Wade reviewed the right
to counsel doctrine since Powell and concluded that a stage is critical
when the presence of counsel is necessary to prevent the ensuing
trial from becoming perfunctory. Conversely, a stage is not critical
where "there is minimal risk that . . . counsel's absence at such
65
stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial."
[I]n addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed
that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of
that right is as much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the otherguarantees
of the Sixth Amendment-the right of the accused to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, and his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
...[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires
that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the
defendant's basic right to a fair trial ....66
The "critical stage" cases, therefore, stand for the proposition that
the state cannot, consistent with the right to a fair trial, deprive the
defendant of the assistance of counsel when counsel is most needed.
61 See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing a critical

stage, even though defendant neither required to advance defenses, nor penalized for
failure to do so); Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 322 (1973) (Stewart,J, concurring), in
which Justice Stewart stated:
Pretrial proceedings are "critical," then, if the presence of counsel is essential "to
protect the fairness of the trial itself".... [A] post-indictment, pretrial lineup at
which the accused was exhibited to identifying witnesses [Wade] was such a critical
stage, because of the substantial possibility that the accused's right to a fair trial
would otherwise be irretrievably lost.
(citation omitted).
63 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
64 Id. at 237 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
65 Id. at 228.
66 Id. at 226-27

(emphasis added).

686

JOE MARGULIES

[Vol. 80

Likewise, in another line of cases, the Court has held that the
state cannot impose conditions upon the defendant which distort
the adversarial process by relieving the state of its burden of
proof.67 Herring v. New York 68 best illustrates this point. In Herring,
the Court struck down a New York law which gave the trial judge the
discretion to refuse to hear closing arguments. 69 Speaking for the
six member majority of the Court, Justice Stewart observed that the
right to counsel is a fundamental right, the contours of which have
been broadly construed. More particularly, the right to the assistance of counsel bars "restrictions upon ...

[defense counsel which

are not] in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding
process ....

The right to the assistance of counsel has thus been

given a meaning that ensures to the defense in a criminal trial the
opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process." ' 70 Because closing argument "is a basic element of the
adversary factfinding process . ...
,,T7 the statute must be struck
down.
The next year, in Geders v. United States, 7 2 the Court unanimously
reaffirmed these principles. Geders involved a challenge to a ruling
of the trial judge barring counsel from meeting with his client during an overnight recess. 7 3 The Fifth Circuit had considered and rejected the claim because the defendant had shown no prejudice
arising out of the trial court's action. 74 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant had been denied the assistance
of counsel. 75 The Court made no mention of the lack of prejudice,
although they expressly approved a decision of the Third Circuit
holding that a defendant in such a case need not show prejudice to
secure relief.76 Once again, the Court relied on the familiar lan-

guage in Powell: to confront the state and adequately present his or
her defense, the defendant required the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him or her.7 7 Because the trial
67 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975); Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
68 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
69 Id. at 858.
70 Id.
7' Id.

72 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
73 Id. at 82.
74 Id. at 85-86.
75 Id. at 91.
76 Geders v. United

States, 425 U.S. 80, 89 (1976) (citing United States v. Venuto,

182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950)).
77

Id.
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judge deprived the defendant of this guidance, reversal was
78
automatic.
The point by now should be clear: the sixth amendment pro79
tects the right to a fair trial. In addition to the appointment cases,
8t
8
0
the critical stage cases, and the governmental interference cases,
the right to counsel protects the right to minimally effective counsel.8 2 In Strickland v. Washington,83 the Court wrote:

In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama... and Gideon v.
Wainwight... this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial ....

That a person who happens to be a

lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough
to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system
to produce just results. An accused is entitled
to be assisted by an
84
attorney... to ensure that the trial is fair.
Moreover, the right to counsel ensures that the defendant is free
from representation by counsel laboring under an actual conflict of
interest.8 5 In Holloway v. Arkansas,s6 the Court observed:
The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth
Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations
have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters. . ... [I]n a case of
joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeat78 Id. at 91. Last term, the Court limited Geders by holding that the defendant had no
sixth amendment right to confer with counsel during a 15 minute break in his testimony.
Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600 (1989). At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed that sixth amendment violations for interference with the attorney-client relationship are not subject to a prejudice analysis. In fact, the Court expressly rejected the
approach of the South Carolina Supreme Court below, which had found a violation but
affirmed the conviction as harmless error. The Court noted that, had there been a violation, prior cases made it clear that the case would not be "subject to the kind of prejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's
performance itself has been constitutionally ineffective." Id. at 595. This, in turn, underscores the difference between system error, for which no inquiry into prejudice is
required, and attorney error, for which prejudice is an essential part of the analysis. See
infra notes 89 through 142 and accompanying text.
79 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
80 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218

(1967).

81 See Peny, 109 S. Ct. at 594; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
82 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
83 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
84 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-86.
85 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
484 (1978).
86 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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ing-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from
to possible pretrial plea negotiations
doing, not only at trial but also 8as
7
and in the sentencing process.

The right at issue in each of these cases is a constant: it is the
right to a fair trial. The nature of the infringement varies, but the
protection of the sixth amendment right to counsel, like that of the

fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, is "as broad as
the mischief against which it seeks to guard." 88 Increasingly, the
"mischief" is systemic resource deprivation, no less a threat to a fair
trial than outright denial of the right to counsel.
B.

THE MEANING OF THE FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEE

Unfortunately, and despite the ease and frequency with which
the Court invokes the phrase "fair trial," it has never seen fit to de-

fine it.89 Two views emerge from the cases. In one line of decisions,
fairness is perceived as a product of procedural rigor. The analysis
focuses on the adequacy and integrity of the adversarial process,
rather than on any particular result. The question is whether the
defendant has been allowed to put the state to its proof. Most relevant to the inquiry are the conditions under which defense counsel
is forced to operate, and the effect these conditions have on the fact-

finding process, as well as the relative inequality the conditions create between the prosecution and defense.
The second line of cases adds another dimension to the fair

trial concept. Fairness here is defined not just as a product of vigorous adversarial testing, but as a '"ust" result-a result which can be

relied upon as having separated the guilty from the innocent. The
focus in these cases is less on the proceeding itself than on the reliability of the outcome in the case before the court. Relief is predicated not just on demonstrating some defect in the process, even if
87 Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 (emphasis in original).
88 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1882); see also United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973) (Court expands the right to counsel "when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself.").
89 Perhaps it eludes definition. On the other hand, the lack of a definition permits
the Court to do precisely what Justice Black predicted: when the text is without meaning, the idea behind it begins to reflect nothing more than whatever meaning is shared
by a current majority of the Court. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989), is a perfect
illustration of this point. The only rational explanation for Perry is that the majority does
not believe a 15 minute interruption in the attorney-client relationship is enough to
make the trial unfair. As Justice Marshall asked rhetorically in dissent, how much of an
infringement is enough? What about a lunch recess? Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The more pressing problem is locating in the text of the sixth amendment support
for this "de minimis-ness" standard. Considering the emphasis most members of this
majority place on adherence to the text, Perry is a remarkable illustration of judicial
activism.
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the defect led to enormous disparity between the state and defense,
but on actual prejudice in the result.
Not surprisingly, the manner in which the Court defines the
substantive right affects the relief it extends. Differences in the
meaning of fairness have thus given rise to differences in the relief
granted. In the first line of cases-those which perceive fairness as a
product of procedural integrity-relief is prophylactic. It extends to
all cases as a per se rule, independent of the circumstances in which
the violation arose. In the second line of cases, relief depends on a
fact-specific showing-prejudice in the outcome-and is limited to
the individual case. Much like in the totality of the circumstances
cases under the due process clause, relief cannot extend beyond the
facts of a particular case. Circumstances which justify reversal in
one case may not suffice in the next. The decision, in other words,
establishes no per se rule.
1.

Fairnessand the Trial Process

The view that fairness implies vigorous adversarial testing derives from the "rich historical heritage" of the right to counsel in
anglo-American law. 90 Once again, the jurisprudence begins with
Powell.9 1 In Powell, the Court reviewed the English common law
principle restricting the right of accused felons to consult with counsel at trial. For a number of reasons; colonial constitutions and statutes overwhelmingly rejected this principle. 9 2 One important
objection was the "inherent irrationality of the English limitation" 9 3 : because the rule applied only to felony proceedings, it was
conceivable that the accused misdemeanant would have access to
94
counsel, but the accused felon would not.

Another, more fundamental objection to the English approach
was its impact on the adversarial process. The drafters of the sixth
amendment recognized the "obvious truth" 95 that the layman, with
"little skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intricate procedural system," 96 would be left to flounder without "the guiding
U.S. at 306.
91 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932).
92 "[I]n at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in
90 Ash, 413

the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the
right was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious crimes .... Id.
93 Ash, 413 U.S. at 306.
94 Powell, 287 U.S. at 60.
95 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
96 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973).
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hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." 9 7
This concern intensified with the advent of the public prosecutor
early in the eighteenth century. With this development, "the accused in the colonies faced a government official whose specific
function it was to prosecute, and who was incomparably more familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the idiosyncra98
sies ofjuries, and, last but not least, the personnel of the court."
From this historical review, and drawing on the language of the
sixth amendment itself, the Court has concluded that "the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial,
when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law
and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." 9 9
In all respects, the emphasis in these cases is on the legitimacy
of the trial process. The reliability of the result, to the extent it
figures at all in the analysis, is viewed not as an end in itself but as a
desirable consequence of vigorous advocacy. 10 0 Nowhere does the
Court suggest that the protections afforded by the sixth amendment
are conditioned upon a showing that the result was "wrong"; rarely,
in fact, does the Court suggest the result is even relevant. 1 1 More
97 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
98 F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 20-21 (1951) (quoted in Ash, 413 U.S. at 308);
see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63 (The sixth amendment right to counsel "embodies a
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel."). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), in which the
Court stated:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, canGovernments...
not be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him ....
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
99 Ash, 413 U.S. at 309.
100 Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. This is particularly apparent in Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853 (1975), where the Court held that a statute granting the trial court authority to
refuse closing argument deprived the defendant of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 858, 865. The Court observed:
The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty
be convicted and the innocent go free. In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important
than the opportunity finally to marshall the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment.
Id. at 862.
101 Id.
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recent decisions continue to define the sixth amendment in these
terms. 102
Relief in this line of cases reflects the nature of the violation.
The violation is systemic, in that it operates without regard either to
particular cases or to the conduct of individual defense counsel. Accordingly, relief is systemic and propyhlactic in the form of a per se
rule mandating the removal of the "taint," or the condition threatening to undermine the adequacy of the adversarial process. 10 3 Future defendants may avail themselves of the rule created in a
particular case by showing they were subject to the taint.
The best example of relief by per se rule is Gideon. As noted,
the Court in Gideon overruled Betts. In Betts, the Court held that a
refusal to appoint counsel in a felony prosecution did not necessarily violate the Constitution. The analysis had to proceed on a caseby-case basis, because "[t]hat which may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other consid104
erations, fall short of such denial."'
Gideon rejected this case-by-case approach and replaced it with a
102 For instance, a trial is fair only so long as the defendant is able to subject the
state's case "to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted-even if defense counsel
may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, the constitutionalguarantee is violated.
Id. at 656-57 (emphasis added).
More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a
criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that have been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Herring, 422 U.S. at 857 n.8. "Thus, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial
process ....
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 n.21 (emphasis added).
See also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, - (1988) (The sixth amendment is
"designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process.... [The essential aim of
the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant .... );
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988) (quoting Kaufman, Does theJudgeHave A Right
to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569 (1975)) ("The paramount importance of vigorous
representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system ofjustice. The system
is premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is 'best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.' "). The Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), stated:
[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an
impartial tribunal .... The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance
of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability
of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney... who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
103 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
104 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
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categorical holding that the right to counsel is a fundamental right,
10 5
made applicable against the states by the fourteenth amendment.
The result of this was to establish a per se rule that defendants are
entitled to the assistance of counsel in all future felony prosecutions, regardless of the facts of a particular case. 10 6
Relief by per se rule is not limited to the actual denial of counsel cases. A per se rule also applies in critical stage cases, governmental interference cases, and conflict of interest cases. In Wade, by
holding that a post-indictment lineup is a critical stage of the proceeding, without regard to whether the identification in that case
was reliable, the Court created a per se exclusionary rule. 10 7 Since
Wade, no post-indictment lineup can proceed without counsel present; any use of a tainted identification is inadmissible unless an independent basis can be shown for its reliability. The relief, in other
words, is systemic, tailored to fit a systemic defect. Just as the defect
operates without regard to particular cases, so does the relief.
Likewise, in Herring, now-Chief Justice Rehnquist took the majority to task for extending the right to counsel, unnecessarily in his
view, to include the opportunity to give a closing argument.' 0 8 By
characterizing the right to counsel as "the right to present a defense
'in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process,' "
and closing argument as a "basic element" in that process, the
Court incorporated closing argument into the fourteenth amendment, making it applicable against the states. 109
But once we have determined that a particular right should be incorporated against the States, we have abandoned case-by-case considerations of fairness. Incorporation,in effect, results in the establishment of a strict
prophylactic rule, one which is to be generally observed in every case regardlessof
its particularcircumstances. It is a judgment on the part of this Court that

the probability of unfairness in the absence of a particularright is so great that
denigration of the right will not be countenanced under any circumstances. I 0
In Herring, the condition which threatened to undermine the adversary process was the refusal by the trial court to allow closing argu105 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339. As the Court recently recognized, every
right to counsel case since Gideon has rejected the case-by-case approach. Murray v.
Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2771 (1989). The only exception is the attorney ineffectiveness cases, where relief continues to depend on the facts of the case before the court.
See infra notes 116 through 142 and accompanying text.
106 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
107 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). See also Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220, 233 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
108 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865-72 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 866 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion id. at 857).
110 Id. at 867-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ments. Because the right to closing arguments is an essential part of
a fair trial, which, in turn, is a fundamental right, this refusal must be
removed by way of "a strict prophylactic rule." Thus, in this situation, a court will conduct no inquiry into the facts of a particular
case, or into the likelihood of prejudice in a particular case. The
relief is systemic, and in the future, no defendant can be tried in any
criminal court without the opportunity to make a closing
argument. 1 1
In Holloway, the right to counsel violation was the refusal by the
trial court either to appoint separate counsel for multiple defendants, or to inquire into whether defense counsel labored under an
actual conflict of interest.' 12 Some courts and commentators had
suggested that relief in such a case should require the defendant to
prove prejudice in the outcome. 1' 3 The United States Supreme
Court thought otherwise: "'To determine the precise degree of
prejudice sustained . . .is at once difficult and unnecessary. The
right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount
of prejudice arising from its denial.' "114 The systemic defect in Holloway was multiple representation in the face of an actual conflict of
interest. Its evil was the gag placed on counsel, which, in turn, pre111 As noted earlier, the Court last term held that a defendant had no sixth amendment right to confer with counsel during a 15 minute break in his testimony. Perry v.
Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600 (1989). At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed the
fact that sixth amendment violations for interference with the attorney-client relationship are not subject to a prejudice analysis, and can never be treated as harmless error.
The Court noted that, had there been a violation, prior cases made it clear that the case
would not be subject "to the kind of prejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's performance itself has been constitutionally ineffective." Id.
112 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978).
113 Id. at 487-88. See also United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); Geer, Representationof Multiple CriminalDefendants: Conflicts of
Interest and the Professional Responsibilitiesof the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119, 12225 (1978).
114 Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1942)). In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988), the Court held that the
erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony at a capital sentencing proceeding was
subject to a harmless error analysis. Importantly, the Court did not, however, retreat
from its holding in Holloway. The standard for harmless error remains whether the violation affected the entire proceeding. Id. As argued elsewhere, the problem of systemic
resource deprivation, like multiple representation of conflicting interests, is in what it
prevents counsel from doing. The crisis in caseloads is such that counsel must sacrifice
one client for the demands of another. Furthermore, the defect, because it impairs
counsel's ability to mount any defense, affects the entire proceeding, and is effectively
concealed from appellate review. That is, the court cannot tell on review of case 'A' that
defense counsel spent all his or her time preparing for trial in case 'B.' Harmless error,
therefore, is inapplicable in resource deprivation cases.
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vented her from challenging the adequacy of the state's case. The
remedy is a per se rule of reversal, allowing for pretrial correction of
the offending condition. No trial can go forward in the future with
15
the condition uncorrected. If it does, reversal is automatic.'
2.

Fairness and a 'Just" Result

As previously mentioned, there is a second line of cases in
which the Court abandons procedural rigor in favor of another,
more prominent concern-reliability in the outcome. The question
in these cases is not merely whether the protections of the adversary
process have been allowed to run their course. More important by
far is whether the proceeding has produced a "just" result, one
which accurately separates the guilty from the innocent. The line of
16
cases begins with Strickland v. Washington.'
In Strickland, the Court faced the problem of attorney ineffectiveness, or "actual ineffectiveness," as the Court labeled it.117 Unlike earlier right to counsel cases, the question in Strickland was
whether the right to counsel provided relief for the defendant represented by incompetent counsel, and if so, what showing was necessary to secure this relief. The Court concluded that the sixth
115 As with Herring, one indication that Holloway created a per se rule appears in the
dissent, which rejected the majority's reluctance to apply a prejudice analysis.
The Court's approach in this case is not premised on an ultimate finding of conflict
of interest or ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, it presumes prudice from the
failure to conduct an inquiry, equating that failure with a violation of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee ....
I am not convinced of the needfor a prophylacticgloss on
the requirements of the Constitution in this area of criminal law.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
116 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland is the first right to counsel case in this line. The
Court had already begun to move in that direction when it decided Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Sykes, the Court adopted the "cause" and "prejudice" standard
in federal collateral review as an excuse for failure to make a timely objection in state
court. After Sykes, if defense counsel fails to observe a valid state contemporaneous objection rule, the underlying claim is waived on federal habeas review unless the defendant can show "cause" for the default and "prejudice" to the defendant as a result. Id. at
87-89.
Sykes replaced the rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1968), where the Court
held that a failure to object would bar subsequent habeas review only if the right to
object was deliberately bypassed for tactical reasons. The inquiry under Noia was
whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to vindicate his federal
claim in state court; if he did, then habeas review could be barred. Id. at 439. With
Sykes, however, what the defendant knew is irrelevant. The question instead is whether
the error by trial counsel was prejudicial to the defendant. Sykes thus introduces a resultspecific test into the area of procedural default. Significantly, the underlying problem in
Sykes is attorney error, for which prejudice becomes part of the inquiry. See infra notes 117
through 142 and accompanying text. Moreover, the express rationale for Sykes was to
discourage "sandbagging" by defense counsel, just as in Strickland. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at
89-90; infra notes 134 through 137 and accompanying text.

117 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683.
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amendment reached these claims, but that to secure relief the defendant had to show not only a deficiency in counsel's performance,
but also that the deficient performance both fell below accepted
standards of competence in the community' 18 and rendered the outcome unreliable. 119
Thus, the Court in Strickland clearly indicates that the critical
inquiry in a right to counsel case is whether counsel's error affected
the outcome, and not merely the trial process. 120 In support of this
assertion, the Court refers to United States v. Morrison.12 1 This, however, is certainly not the holding in Morrison. In Morrison, two agents
of the Drug Enforcement Agency had twice met and conversed with
the defendant without the knowledge or permission of defendant's
counsel. 122 The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the conduct of the agents violated her right
to counsel.123 Significantly, the motion was conspicuously devoid of
any suggestion that the supposed violation had any impact on the
proceeding. 124 The district court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty. 12 5 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the appropriate remedy
for the sixth amendment violation was to dismiss the indictment
127
with prejudice. 126 The Supreme Court reversed.
In its six page opinion in Morrison, the Court made it clear that
118 Id. at 687.

Id. The critical passage in Strickland is as follows:
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial
to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.
Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
120 See, e.g., id. at 694 ("[T]he defendant... [must] show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").
121 449 U.S. 361 (1980).
122 Id. at 362.
123 Id. at 363.
124 The motion contained no allegation that the claimed violation had prejudiced
the quality or effectiveness of respondent's legal representation; nor did it assert
that the behavior of the agents had induced her to plead guilty, had resulted in the
prosecution having a stronger case against her, or had any other adverse impact on
her legal position. The motion was based solely upon the egregious behavior of the
agents, which was described as having "interfered" in some unspecified way with
respondent's right to counsel.
Id. at 363.
125 Id.
126 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 363 (1980).
127 Id. at 363-64.
119
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the essential inquiry in right to counsel jurisprudence is not, as
Strickland would later suggest, whether the error had any effect on
the judgment. Rather the correct inquiry is whether the error undermined the integrity of the adversarial process. Indeed, the
Court's analysis began with the familiar recognition that the right to
counsel, "fundamental to our system of justice, is meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminalprocess." 128 After briefly reviewing the
remedy applied in earlier cases, the Court summarized the doctrine
in this way:
Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the taint
by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. The premise
of our prior cases is that the constitutional infringement identified has
had or threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the criminalproceeding, however, there is no basis
for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full
29
recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial.'
Morrison simply cannot support the weight Strickland places on
it. Far from supporting the proposition in Strickland, Morrison instead represents the view that the right to counsel protects the proa3 0
cess, and not merely its result. In fact, in United States v. Cronic,
decided the same day as Strickland, the Court cites Morrison for precisely that: "Absent some effect of the challenged conduct on the
reliability of the trialprocess, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated."'' 1 Indeed, with the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 13 2 the Court had never intimated what it now held in
Strickland: the critical inquiry in right to counsel jurisprudence was
into the reliability of the result.
Nothing in Morrison, or any other right to counsel decision, supId. at 364 (emphasis added).
Id. at 365 (emphasis added). See also id. at 366-67 (emphasis added), in which the
Court stated:
[R]espondent has demonstrated no prejudice of any kind, either transitory or permanent, to the ability of her counsel to provide adequate representation in these
criminal proceedings.... We ...conclude that the solution provided by the Court
of Appeals is inappropriate where the violation, which we assume has occurred, has
had no adverse impact upon the criminal proceedings.
130 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
131 Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
132 446 U.S. 335 (1980). The Court in Strickland meekly acknowledged that Cuyler also
presented an example of attorney ineffectiveness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 683 (1984). In Strickland, however, the Court could not rely on Cuyler to support
the proposition that the sixth amendment protected the reliability of the result, because
in Cuyler, the Court had committed itself to its earlier view, expressed in Holloway, that
no showing of prejudice in the outcome was required. For a discussion of Cuyler, see
infra notes 143 through 167 and accompanying text.
128
129

1989]

RESOURCE DEPRIVATION

ports the result in Strickland.i3 3 If Strickland purports to follow from
prior right to counsel jurisprudence, and it does, then the decision
is unprincipled. Indeed, Strickland, to the extent it makes sense at
all, makes sense only if it is understood as fundamentally different
from the prior right to counsel cases. That difference is the distinction between system and attorney ineffectiveness.
Every right to counsel decision before Strickland presented an
example of system error. As the Court noted, Strickland was the first
example of attorney error to come before the Court.1 3 4 But the rationale driving the result in Strickland has no place in cases involving
system error. The unarticulated concern in Strickland is with
sandbagging. The fear is that defense counsel, if faced with the virtual certainty that his or her client would be convicted, would inject
ineffective assistance into the case as a way to protect the client on
appeal. With nothing to lose, defense counsel can always go bellyup and secure a reversal on appeal. The hope is that for any
number of reasons, the next trial, if one occurs, will be more hospitable. The client, meanwhile, loses nothing, particularly if he is incarcerated pretrial and is receiving court-appointed counsel.
To dispel this fear, the Court introduced the requirement of
actual prejudice in the outcome. Because the defendant must prove
his innocence-effectively what Strickland requires-sandbagging is
not worth its cost. In other words, if the defendant cannot secure a
reversal merely by pointing to attorney errors, counsel will have no
incentive to inject error into the case. 135 Although the Court in
Strickland made only oblique reference to this concern,

3 6

more re-

133 That is, with the possible exception of Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335. See infra notes 143
through 167 and accompanying text.
134 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683.
135 This explanation should by no means be read as an endorsement. The "sandbagging" rationale as a justification for the prejudice requirement has been the subject of

considerable criticism. Perhaps the most significant failing, however, is that it relieves

the trial judge of all responsibility for ensuring the fairness of the trial process. In practice, the trial judge can, and will, ignore attorney error, knowing that virtually no
amount of incompetence is too great to support a conviction, as long as the defendant
must also prove prejudice. If no amount of attorney error will disrupt the flow of convictions (the Fifth Circuit, for instance, has never granted relief in a capital case under

Strickland), then a trial judge has no incentive to encourage attorneys to meet a minimum
level of proficiency. The point in the text, then, is to explain and not to excuse. But in
any event, even if we grant the Court its explanation, this justification loses all force
outside the context of the attorney error cases.
136 The Court alluded to this problem when it observed:

Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in
attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice. The government is not responsiblefor, and hence not able to
prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or a sentence.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added). The implication of this passage is that,
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cent attorney ineffectiveness cases have been more explicit. 13 7
By contrast, cases involving system ineffectiveness raise concerns about the integrity of the adversarial process. There can be
no fear of sandbagging, because the defect by definition is separate
from the conduct of individual counsel. In Powell and Gideon the defect was the actual denial of counsel by the state. In the critical stage
cases, the problem is the denial of counsel, again by the state, when
it matters most. In Herring and Geders, as with all governmental interference cases, the question is whether the state can intrude into
the attorney-client relationship in a way that impedes the ability of
defense counsel to subject the state's case to adversarial testing. In
Holloway, the issue was whether the state could require counsel to
labor under an actual conflict of interest. In each case, the condition which either undermined or threatened to undermine the adequacy of the fact-finding process operated entirely apart from the
performance of individual counsel. 13 8 Indeed, counsel's performance is irrelevant to the analysis, except that because of the condition, he or she could not provide the kind of testing envisioned by
39
the sixth amendment.1
where the government is responsible for, and hence can prevent, the defect, prejudicemeaning factual innocence-need not be shown. And, as demonstrated, this is precisely
the rule in system ineffectiveness cases.
137 The best example is Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n.7 (1986). In
Kimmelman, the Court held that an attorney's failure to raise a fourth amendment claim
was cognizable on federal habeas review under the Strickland standard. In a footnote,
the Court rejected the suggestion that defense counsel will resort to sandbagging, because that concern was already met by the Strickland Court's requirement of actual
prejudice:
We have no reason to believe that defense attorneys will "sandbag"-that is, consciously default or poorly litigate their clients' Fourth Amendment claims in state
court in the hope of gaining more favorable review ... in ... federal habeas proceedings.... [Clounsel's client has little, if anything, to gain and everything to lose
through such a strategy. It should be remembered that the only incompetently litigated and defaulted Fourth Amendment claims that could lead to a reversal of the
defendant's conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds are potentially outcome-determinative claims.... By defaulting, counsel shifts the burden to the defendant to
prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney's incompetence, he would not have been convicted.
Id. This standard-a reasonable probability that, absent the attorney errors, the result
would have been different-is taken directly from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. With
this passage, then, the Court confirms two things: 1) sandbagging is indeed the concern
which motivated the Court in Strickland to require the defendant prove actual prejudice;
and 2) the Court views the requirement of actual prejudice as a sufficient response to the
problem.
138 In fact, in the one case prior to Stricklandin which counsel's performance was relevant to the analysis, the Court required the defendant to prove that counsel's errors
adversely affected the adequacy of counsel's representation. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 348-50 (1980). In practice, courts read Cuyler to require prejudice in the outcome.
See infra notes 163 through 167 and accompanying text.
139 It bears repeating that while the attorney ineffectiveness cases focus principally on
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Just as the meaning of the underlying right is different in attorthe reliability of the result, there remains concern for the integrity of the process. Indeed, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1984), an attorney ineffectiveness
case, stands for the proposition that some attorney errors are so extraordinarily egregious that no inquiry into prejudice is required. Inasmuch as this rule threatens to undermine Strickland, however, lower courts have been reluctant to reverse a conviction
based on Cronic. Such a case usually requires a breakdown in counsel's performance so
complete as to constitute an outright denial of counsel. For example, in United States ex
reL Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1016-18 (7th Cir. 1988), defense counsel neglected to file an appellate brief in response to the state's interlocutory appeal of a suppression order. The appellate court reversed suppression and the defendant was
convicted at trial. The Seventh Circuit, on habeas, held that counsel's failure constituted "a complete denial of assistance of counsel," and the reversal was thereby warranted under Cronic.
Still, to the extent Cronic suggests some constitutional minima in attorney ineffectiveness cases, the matter is unsettled. Plainly, a focus only on the result of the adjudication suggests that no amount of procedural irregularity would upset the verdict, so long
as a reviewing court can be confident that the person convicted is guilty. This of course
is a variant of the harmless error doctrine, which likewise tolerates constitutional error,
so long as the result is "correct." It is also fundamentally inconsistent with Cronic. What
of the case where the Court could be absolutely certain of the defendant's guilt, despite
attorney errors which otherwise would amount to a violation of Cronic?
In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the Court ventured into this tension. There the Court held that a defendant may raise an ineffective assistance claim in
federal habeas review, based on trial counsel's failure to object in state court to the
admission of illegally seized evidence. Id. at 383. In so holding, the Court rejected the
argument that, because illegally seized evidence is "'typically reliable and often the
most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant,'" defendants should be foreclosed from challenging their conviction obtained in this way by
means of attorney ineffectiveness. Id. at 379 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490
(1976)). The clear import of this argument would be to overrule Cronic, at least as applied to fourth amendment errors. Because these defendants are factually guilty, no
amount of procedural irregularity would justify a reversal.
Justice Brennan, speaking for six members of the Court, rejected the argument:
[W]e have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence. The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent
and guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to
matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.
Id. at 380.
Justice Powell, speaking for ChiefJustice Burger and now-ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
concurred in the judgment, but added an ominous response to the majority on this issue. Relying on the "results" view of the right to counsel as it appears in Strickland, he
wrote:
This reasoning [in Strickland] strongly suggests that only errors that call into question the basic justice of the defendant's conviction suffice to establish prejudice
under Strickland.... As many of our cases indicate, the admission of illegally seized
but reliable evidence does not lead to an unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict....
Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable
evidence renders verdicts Less fair and just ....Thus, the harm suffered by respondent in this case is not the denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but
rather the absence of a windfall.
Id. at 395-96 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added on "verdict").
Justice Powell concluded with a rebuke to the majority for its "rhetoric" that the sixth
amendment applies to guilty and innocent alike. "Courts and litigants should not be
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ney error case, so too is the relief. The remedy in attorney error
decisions is granted on a case-by-case basis. This in fact follows automatically from the structure of the decision in Strickland: to succeed, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance
fell below prevailing standards of professionalism. But, at least according to the Court, "No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel ....
[A] court deciding an actual [attorney] ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts
of a particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.... The
court must ... determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions141were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Moreover, a requirement that the defendant demonstrate prejudice
in the outcome is necessarily fact specific, because a deficient performance in an otherwise weak case may not justify reversal, while
the defendant with the colorable claim of factual innocence may, on
the same deficient conduct, suceed in demonstrating prejudice.
This inquiry into the totality of the circumstances is imported
from the due process analysis of the fourteenth amendment. The
salient point is that Strickland, as well as the more recent attorney
error cases, are the only right to counsel decisions to rely on this
framework. In the waning days of the past term, the Court recognized that since the demise of Betts, right to counsel jurisprudence
has rejected the case-by-case approach, relying instead on the categoric mandate of per se rules.' 4 2 The one exception is the jurisprudence on attorney error.
deceived by such pronouncements," he warned, and apparently, Cronic notwithstanding,
the matter remains open. Id. at 397.
140 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
141 Id. at 690. This, of course, rings of the discredited due process standard announced in Betts v. Brady:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts
in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense ofjustice, may, in other circumstances, and
in light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). In Strickland, the "other circumstance" which
dooms the vast majority of attorney error cases is an inability to show prejudice in the
outcome.
142 Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2771 (1989). To underscore the difference
between relief in system error cases and relief in attorney error cases, the totality of the
circumstances is the approach steadfastly reected by the Court in the critical stage cases.
See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 233 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 n.8 (1972) (right to counsel as described in Wade and Gilbert,
creating a per se rule of exclusion, does not apply to preindictment showup, though
such a procedure may, under the totality of the circumstances, violate due process).
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CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS AN ILLUSTRATION

The leading conflict of interest cases, Holloway and Cuyler, vividly illustrate the divergence between system ineffectiveness and attorney ineffectiveness. In the former, concerns for fairness in the
trial process lead to a per se rule. In the latter, an interest in the
reliability of the result leads to relief only in the individual case.
In Holloway, the trial court appointed one public defender to
14 3
represent three defendants charged with robbery and rape.
Twice before trial, as well as during trial, defense counsel moved to
have separate counsel appointed for each defendant because of "a
possibility of a conflict of interest."' 14 4 The court denied each
45
request.
At trial, all three defendants testified. 14 6 Counsel then indicated he could not conduct a cross-examination because as counsel
for each of them, he could not ask questions of one which would
tend to incriminate either of the others. 14 7 The court responded to
defense counsel's plight by instructing him to "just put them on the
stand and tell the Court that you have advised them of their rights
and they want to testify; then you tell the man to go ahead and relate
what he wants to. That's all you need to do."' 14 8 The jury convicted
the defendants of all counts. 149 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, 15 0 and the United States Supreme Court reversed,' 5 ' concluding that the defendants had been denied the
effective assistance of counsel.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court initially recognized that joint
representation "is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of
effective assistance of counsel.' 152 Joint representation may in certain cases in fact prove advantageous to the defendant. 15 3 On the
other hand, the Court recognized that multiple representation in
143 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 477 (1978).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 477-79.
146 Id. at 478.
147 Id. at 478-80.
148 Id. at 480.
149 Id. at 481.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 491.
152 Id. at 482.
153 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). The Court did not make clear
what advantages could accrue to the defendants in such a case, except to mutter the old
saw that "'[a] common defense often gives strength against a common attack.'" Id. at
482-83 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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the face of an actual conflict of interest makes an unfair trial a virtual
certainty:
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what
it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, in this case
it may well have precluded defense counsel.., from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for
the prosecution .... Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent
an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence . . .or from
arguing at sentencing .... Examples can be readily multiplied. The
mere physicalpresenceofan attorney does notfulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on

crucial matters. 154

Thus, the right to counsel is violated because the condition renders the trial unfair. More importantly, the analysis speaks in terms
of the effect this condition can have on the integrity of the fact-finding process: "the evil-it bears repeating-is in what the advocate
finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but
also as to possible ...

plea negotiations and in the sentencing pro-

cess."' 5 5 Holloway, then, as a sixth amendment case, falls squarely
within the class of cases which perceive the sixth amendment as a
guarantor of procedural rigor.
Holloway also presented the Court with an interesting dichotomy: recall that some multiple representation rewards the defendant, while multiple representation of conflicting interests silences
defense counsel and destroys the adversarial process. The first
should be encouraged, while the second violates the sixth amendment. Significantly, the Court decided that defense counsel was "in
the best position" to determine whether the representation in a particular case was of the former or latter dimension. Where counsel
identifies and informs the trial court that multiple representation
could lead to an actual conflict, the court is under a duty to inquire.
If the court fails "either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk [of a conflict] was too remote .

.

.

."

the defendant is denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. 1 56 Because counsel in Holloway made precisely this showing and the trial judge refused to act, the Supreme
Court set aside the convictions.
As for the appropriate relief, the Court concluded that the con154

Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).

155 Id. at 489-90 (emphasis in original).
156 Id. at 484. To put the matter in the abstract, if the court fails either to determine
that the offending condition in fact poses no risk to the adversarial process, or if it does,
fails to remove the condition, the defendant is denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel.
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flict pervaded the entire proceeding and therefore could never be
harmless error.' 57 No inquiry into prejudice was required.
"To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained ... is at once
difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice15cal8
culations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
Holloway is the quintessential system ineffectiveness decision.
One source of incompetent counsel is the joint representation of
conflicting interests. Its evil is the gag placed on counsel, quite
apart from his or her own abilities: In fact, it is the attorney's devotion to one client which inevitably commands that he or she sacrifice
another. Because the attorney is in the best position to identify the
damgerous conditions, he or she has the right to raise the problem
with the trial court. If counsel raises the problem, and if the judge
fails to correct the condition, reversal is compelled with no inquiry
into prejudice. The remedy is a prophylactic rule allowing for pretrial correction of the offending condition, such that no trial can go
forward in the future with the condition raised but uncorrected.
Cuyler addresses the situation left open in Holloway-where
counsel fails before trial to alert the trial court of the conflict. In
Cuyler, the Court held that a defendant who waits until after trial to
claim ineffective assistance based on a conflict of interest must prove
more than the mere existence of the offending condition. 5 9 As the
Court had noted in Holloway, multiple representation is not per se
violative of the Constitution. Because Holloway also recognized that
defense counsel was in the best position to detect potential conflicts,
she was charged with bringing the conflict to the court's attention.
In the absence of such an alert, a trial court may presume either that
a conflict did not exist, or if it did, that the lawyer and his clients
60
considered and rejected whatever risk it posed.'
Id. at 488.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (quoting Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942)); see also id. at 489 ("[T]his Court has concluded that the
assistance of counsel is among those 'constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,'" (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
159 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980).
160 Id. at 346-47. This is another example of attorney error jurisprudence relieving
the trial court of its obligation to ensure the fairness of the process. See supra note 135.
It also serves to underscore the similarity between Cuyler and the other attorney error
cases. See supra notes 116 through 142 and accompanying text. The conflict can be
brought to the trial court in other ways than by an objection by defense counsel. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Georgia 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981) (conflict raised by state). For whatever reason, when the judge knows of the conflict, he or she has an automatic duty to inquire. Id.
at n.18.
157
158
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To win reversal, therefore, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that the multiple representation in his or her case was
constitutional. To do this, the defendant must demonstrate that the
multiple representation "adversely affected his lawyer's performance."' 161 Furthermore, relief requires that the defendant do more
than show the conflict of interest. He or she must also point to specific instances in the record in which counsel's performance was adversely affected by the conflict.162 The inquiry clearly proceeds on a
case-by-case basis; the defendant must show how the conflict affected his or her particular case.
Cuyler thus presaged the analysis in Strickland, where the Court
clearly held that on review, a case of attorney ineffectiveness has a
presumption of legitimacy. 163 To overcome this, the defendant
must demonstrate that the particular failings of counsel prejudiced
the outcome. Cuyler anticipates this holding. In Cuyler, counsel's
omission was the failure to alert the trial judge of the possible conflict. A reviewing court is allowed to presume, therefore, that the
condition did not exist, and that the multiple representation was
consistent with the right to counsel. To overcome this presumption,
the defendant must demonstrate that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's performance."'' 64 This is analogous to Strickland,
where a case likewise comes to a reviewing court with a presumption
of legitimacy that the defendant must overcome by showing preju65
dice in the outcome.'
161 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.
162 See, e.g., Danner v. United States, 820 F.2d 1166, 1169 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1012 (1988); Oliver v. Wainwright, 782 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11 th Cir. 1986),
cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
163 United States v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 648, 694 (1984).
164 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
165 Speaking for the majority, Justice Powell tried to advance the view that a performance "adversely affected" by a conflict of interest and "prejudice in the outcome" were
two different things. "[A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to
obtain relief." Id. at 349-50. The Court offers no suggestion as to how a defendant
could successfully show an adverse affect without also showing prejudice.
The Court felt compelled to make this claim in order to suggest that Cuyler did not
change Holloway. That is, in Holloway, the Court went to great lengths to insist that the
right to the assistance of counsel is " 'too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to
indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice ......."Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76). Yet
Cuyler seemed to be indulging in precisely that sort of "nice" calculation. Justice Powell's response was to suggest that "actual affect" is different than "prejudice."
The point in the text, however, is that Cuyler is fundamentally different from Holloway. The latter is a system ineffectiveness case, where prejudice in the outcome is never
a part of the inquiry (harmless error excepted). The former is an attorney ineffectiveness case, where, rightly or wrongly, prejudice is always part of the inquiry. The Court's
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Significantly, in Cuyler, unlike in Holloway, the analysis did not
focus on the adversarial process. The Court instead focused on the
reliability of the result, and relief is contingent upon a showing that
the conflict "adversely affected" the lawyers' performance. Absent
"special circumstances," the process is presumed to have operated
correctly. 16 6 If the multiple representation were evil, Holloway gave
counsel a right to object. Having failed to do so, defense counsel
cannot now blame the state, because "[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that
verbal gymnastics, therefore, were quite unnecessary: prejudice belonged in Cuyler and
not in Holloway.
Not surprisingly, a review of lower court decisions demonstrates that, while the
courts regularly intone the admonition that a defendant with a Cuyler claim need not
show prejudice, in practice they require that very showing. Sometimes the requirement
is distressingly explicit. See, e.g., Kirby v. Dutton, 831 F.2d 1280, 1283 (6th Cir. 1987)
(court finds actual conflict of interest, but affirms conviction because "there was no prejudice to petitioner resulting from this conflict"); United States v. Abner, 825 F.2d 835,
844-45 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversal unwarranted because defendant could not show that
conflict caused an adverse affect on him, and not merely on counsel's performance);
United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 1985) (in Cuyler context, reversal
usually the result of failure to present outcome-determinative evidence); United States &V
reL Hanrahan v. Thieret, 695 F. Supp. 372, 388-89 (N.D. Il. 1988) (even assuming conflict existed, reversal unwarranted because claim was without merit); Ruiz v. State, 275
Ark. 410, 415, 630 S.W.2d 44, 47-48, cert. denied sub nom., Ruiz v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882
(1982) (counsel representing multiple defendants is presumptively effective, and defendant must show prejudice in the outcome to secure reversal); Dean v. State, 433
N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 1982) (conflict, but no prejudice shown because defendants
would have suffered the same flaw in their cases when represented by separate counsel,
reversal unwarranted).
The California Supreme Court is one of the few courts bold enough to try to unravel the purported distinction between "adverse affect" on representation and prejudice in the outcome-a distinction it admitted "is not entirely clear." People v.
Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 104 n.16, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 62, 672 P.2d 835, 845 n.16 (1983).
Upon reviewing some of the approaches taken by other courts, the court in Mroczko
concluded, "[a]s a practical matter, the Supreme Court's formulation seems to envision
an analysis of whether there has been some identifiable prejudice to the right of effective
representation, but not an analysis of whether that prejudice affected the outcome of the
case." Id. at 108-09, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67, 672 P.2d at 845 n.16. While this may be
what the Supreme Court "envisions," expecting a court to differentiate between "prejudice" and "prejudice affecting the outcome" expects entirely too much, as the cases
noted above indicate. Indeed, even the Court in Mroczko examined the record for prejudice in the outcome, and not merely prejudice to the attorney's performance. Id. at 10809, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67, 672 P.2d at 848-49.
One escape from this conundrum would be to collapse Cuyler into Holloway and presume prejudice. This, however, invites sandbagging and ignores the distinction between system and attorney error. Consequently, the way to treat Cuyler consistent with
other right to counsel cases, and the approach which avoids the hair-splitting suggested
by Mroczko, is to collapse Cuyler into Strickland. And this, in practice, is what courts have
done.
166 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47. The Court does not indicate what it would consider
such a "special circumstance."
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will result in reversal of a conviction ....
D.

RESOURCE DEPRIVATION

This Article began with an inquiry into the proper way to analyze the impact of resource deprivation in indigent defense cases.
The answer should now be apparent. Resource deprivation is an
example of system ineffectiveness. Like every system case, resource
deprivation critically impairs the ability of the accused to subject the
state's case to the rigors of adversarial testing. As with every case of
system ineffectiveness, it operates quite independent of the conduct,
or competence, of individual counsel. Indeed, like the attorney in
Holloway, the evil of impoverished defense counsel "is in what the
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at
trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. '"168 This evil also includes the neglect of pretrial
investigations, legal research, and consultation with clients. Thus,
whenever the accused requires the "guiding hand of counsel," it will
be lacking. "The mere physical presence of an attorney does not
fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters."' 1 69
When the crush of cases reduces the attorney to a "mere physical
presence," the defense counsel's lips could be no more effectively
sealed than if the state forbade him or her to speak.
There can be no risk of sandbagging in a claim of resource deprivation, because the defect does not turn on the performance of
individual counsel. The evil-"it bears repeating"-is not in what
the attorney by his or her own delinquence fails to do, but rather in
what the system, by its failure to respect the right to the "assistance
of counsel," does to the accused. Nor is there risk that frivolous
claims of resource deprivation will inundate the courts. Analogizing
to Holloway, the defendant must have a right to raise resource deprivation at the pretrial stage. The defendant, therefore, must demonstrate to the trial court the condition of which he complains. This
provides a threshold below which relief will not be granted. It also
provides a safeguard against abuses by the trial court because, as in
Holloway, a failure to correct the condition is reversible error.' 7 0 A
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 488. This approach also returns to the trial court some responsibility for
ensuring the fairness of the process. By vesting the court with a duty to inquire, and
making a failure of that duty reversible error, the rule guarantees that the trial court will
not be a party to slipshod representation caused by overburdened defense counsel.
167
168
169
170
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reviewing court will not inquire whether the outcome of the case is
"just," because inquiries into the reliability of the outcome have no
place in a claim of system error.
This, in turn, leads to the appropriate relief. In system cases,
the remedy is prophylactic, extending to all defendants subject to
the debilitating condition. Most importantly, relief in system cases
is not predicated on a showing of prejudice in the outcome-something reserved only for attorney error cases. Accordingly, relief
from resource deprivation should be systemic. Because the system
producing the conviction has broken down, there can be no presumption of legitimacy in the outcome. There can be, therefore, no
requirement that a defendant demonstrate prejudice in the result.
III.

THE CASELAW

The recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Monsantol7 1 and Caplin & Drysdale v. United States 17 2 raised, albeit indirectly, the problem of resource deprivation in indigent defense.
The opinions declined to reach the issue of resource deprivation,
however, and unfortunately cannot be taken to support or refute the
doctrinal foundations of this Article. Both cases presented constitutional and statutory challenges to the federal drug forfeiture statute. 173 This statute authorizes forfeiture to the government of
"property constituting, or derived from . -. . proceeds ... obtained"
from drug-law violations, 174 including, the Court held, "assets that
an accused intends to use to pay his attorneys."' 75 The inevitable
result of this interpretation is that "there will be cases where a defendant will be unable to retain the attorney of his choice, when that
defendant would have been able to hire that lawyer if he had access
to forfeitable assets .... -176 It was this interpretation which the
criminal defendants, petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale and respondent
in Monsanto, challenged under the sixth amendment.
These cases are in some respects similar to the problem of resource deprivation in indigent defense: the forfeiture is a state-created condition which threatens to undermine the adversarial
process, or so defendants alleged. Indeed, some of the circuit
courts of appeal to consider the sixth amendment claim had ana171 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).

172 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
173 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
174 Id.

175 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
176 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
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lyzed it from this perspective. 177 The Supreme Court, however, expressly declined to do so, analyzing the statute from the more
limited perspective of an alleged infringement on the right to counsel of choice. From the outset, the Court assumed away the entire
problem of resource deprivation in indigent defense:
The [Sixth] amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the
right to adequate representation, but those who do not have the
means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long
as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.... Nor

does the Government deny that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney

whom that defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to represent
the defendant ....

178

This passage is nothing more than a declaration that appointed
counsel are presumptively capable of representing a defendant in a
forfeiture case. The Court made this presumption more explicit
later in the opinion when it rejected a suggestion that the forfeiture
statute would lead to "a type ofper se ineffective assistance of counsel" because of the "particular complexity of RICO or drug-enterprise cases."' 179 In other words, the fact that counsel is court177 Judge Oakes, for instance, of the Second Circuit, believed the statute was unconstitutional. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 85-87 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). He wrote:
The Sixth Amendment is implicated not only on the individual level of the particular defendant, but also on the institutional level of the criminal justice system as a
whole.... I ... would not limit the analysis, as does the majority, to weighing the
Government's interest in forfeiture against the defendant's interest in using his
property to employ counsel of his choice. Rather, I would also consider the systemic interest of permitting defense counsel to perform their proper role in our
adversary system ofjustice. As the Supreme Court said in Cronic . . . "[t]he very
premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted
and the innocent go free .... The process itself Is worthy of protection....

.... By failing to credit the institutional interests in a fair adversarial system, the
majority opinion provides the Government with a negative, indeed an unwholesome, power over the defendant's choice of counsel in the very type of complex
cases where astute, experienced counsel is most needed .... Can we seriously contend that a proper balance would be effected in such cases by giving a defendant,
made "indigent" by the Government's assertion of a potential forfeiture claim, a
young attorney from an underfunded, overworked public defender's office for the
ensuing 6-15 month trial?
Id. at 86 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
178 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652 (1989) (emphasis
added).
179 Id. at 2655 n.7; see also In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d
637, 646-47 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("We ... reject the contention that appointed
counsel are presumptively unqualified to handle Continuing Criminal Enterprise
cases."), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).

1989]

RESOURCE DEPRIVATION

709

appointed does not, by itself, amount to a finding of prospective
ineffective assistance.
There is nothing extraordinary in this proposition, nor is it contrary to the premise of this Article. It merely rejects a presumption
of ineffectiveness absent a showing that the defect at issue had, or
will have, some tangible effect on the fairness of the proceeding.
The Court has done this on a number of occasions.18 0
Thus, the essential function of the sixth amendment right to
counsel is to guarantee a fair trial, but if the defendant cannot
demonstrate how the forfeiture will jeopardize that right, then he or
she has stated no sixth amendment violation. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court did not resolve the question of whether
a particular defendant states a sixth amendment violation when he
or she successfully makes that demonstration. That is, a defendant
cannot argue that appointed counsel, merely because he or she is
appointed, will be ineffective. That, however, does not resolve the
issue of whether the defendant can argue that appointed counsel is
incompetent because he or she is subject to enumerated disadvantages caused by resource deprivation, and therefore cannot put the
state's case to its proof. Neither Monsanto nor Caplin & Drysdale addresses this question. 1 8 '
180 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981). This is also consistent with the approach taken by cases analyzing the absence of expert assistance to indigent defendants as a due process violation. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
323 n.1 (1985) (defendant cannot rely on "undeveloped assertions" that expert assistance would help his case; he must make some showing of how the resources contribute
to his right to a fair trial). Or, alternatively, how the absence of these experts detracts
from that right. See Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2857 (1988); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710-12 (11th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
Another analogy can be made to the conflict of interest cases, Cuyler and Holloway,
discussed supra. The Court in these cases rejected the suggestion that multiple representation of defendants by a single counsel creates a presumption of ineffectiveness. To
secure relief without a showing of actual affect on the outcome, counsel must raise the
matter pre-trial and demonstrate how the conflict jeopardizes the defendants' right to a
fair trial. Similarly, in the forfeiture cases, the Court rejected the notion that courtappointed counsel is presumptively ineffective. By analogy to Holloway and Cuyler, to
secure relief pretrial, the defendant who has had his assets forfeited must raise the matter pretrial and demonstrate how the seizure imperils his right to a fair trial. Monsanto
and Caplin & Dysdale do not foreclose this avenue.
181 And then there is this interesting footnote in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 662 n.31 (1984) (citations omitted):
The Government suggests that a presumption of prejudice is justified when counsel
is subject to "external constraints" on his performance. In this case the Court of
Appeals identified an "external" constraint-the District Court's decision to give
counsel only 25 days to prepare for trial. The fact that the accused can attribute a
deficiency in his representation to a source external to trial counsel does not make it
any more or less likely that he received the type of trial envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment, nor does itjustify reversal of his conviction absent an actual effect on
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While the Supreme Court has been silent, other courts have
considered the problem of ineffective assistance as a result of rethe trial process or the likelihood of such an effect .

. .

. That is made clear by

Chambers and Avery. Both cases involved "external constraints" on counsel in the
form of court-imposed limitations on the length of pretrial preparation, yet in
neither did the Court presume that the "constraint" had an effect on the fairness of
the trial.... Conversely, we have presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an
actual conflict of interest, despite the fact that the constraints on counsel in that
context are entirely self-imposed.
The premise of this footnote is that "external constraints" are no more inherently
-likely to produce an unfair trial than are "self-imposed" constraints. Certainly this is
true: we can easily envision any number of "constraints," of whatever origin, which have
no effect on the trial. By the same token, we can just as easily posit constraints which
reduce the trial to a sham. But this observation does no more than reinforce the point
made earlier: all right to counsel jurisprudence protects the right to a fair trial, and that
right can be imperiled by system no less than attorney ineffectiveness.
Having said that, however, the question remains whether a trial made unfair because of external constraints is the same, for sixth amendment purposes, as a trial made
unfair because of attorney incompetence. Here, the answer is clearly no. In the latter,
the system is by definition presumed to have operated correctly. The defect lies exclusively in the conduct of individual counsel. "The government is not responsible for, and
hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in a reversal of a conviction or
sentence." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 648, 693 (1984). Accordingly, it is at
least rational to expect the defendant who challenges this conviction to show that the
errors so undermined the otherwise adequate process as to lead to an unreliable result.
Prejudice, in other words, is arguably an appropriate part of the inquiry. But see supra
note 135. And contrary to the language in Cronic, the Court did not presume prejudice
in Cuyler. Indeed, the Court expressly held that the burden is on the defendant to show
how counsel's errors actually affected the lawyer's performance. In practice, as noted
earlier, this requires a showing of prejudice. See supra notes 159 through 170 and accompanying text.
On the other side of the equation, as long ago as 1940 when the Court decided
Avery, and as recently as last term, with the decision in Perry v. Leeke, the Court has
refused to extend the protections of the sixth amendment to de minimus infringements of
the right to counsel. See also Morrison, 449 U.S. at 361. The point at which a particular
infringement becomes something more than de minimus will of course be subject to dispute. Once that point is reached, however, the cases are abundantly clear that prejudice
is presumed and reversal is automatic. The only qualification to this rule, as explained
in the text, is the harmless error doctrine, where prejudice is presumed; but the state is
given an opportunity to rebut this presumption by showing that the violation had no
effect on the outcome. However, the harmless error rule is likely to have no application
to the problem described in this Article, because systemic resource deprivation pervades
and undermines the entire trial process. See the discussion infra, notes 182 through 200
of State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 362, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1984) ("The insidiousness of
overburdening defense counsel is that it can result in concealing from the courts, and
particularly the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that is done to defendants by their attorneys' excessive caseloads."). Where the impact of the violation
cannot be isolated and considered apart from the rest of the case, the error cannot be
harmless. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988).
The thesis of this Article is not that external constraints alone warrant reversal, but
that external constraints must be analyzed under the framework appropriate to them.
This framework is fundamentally different from that which is employed to analyze the
effect of "self-imposed" limitations caused by attorney incompetence.
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source deprivation, with interesting results. In State v. Smith, 18 2 the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that the indigent defense system in
one Arizona county was so pervasively and profoundly flawed that
any defendant convicted under the system was presumptively denied the right to effective assistance of counsel." 1 3 Prejudice was
presumed, and the burden fell to the state to rebut the presumption. 18 4 In addition, in Luckey v. Harris,18 5 the Eleventh Circuit recently held that allegations of prospective ineffective assistance
caused by systemic defects in the representation of indigents in
l 6
Ge6rgia states a claim under the sixth amendment.'
Smith involved the following practice:
In May of each year a bid letter goes out from the presiding judge of
Mohave County to all attorneys in the county. It calls for sealed bids
.... No limitation is suggested on caseload or hours, nor is there any
criteria for evaluating ability or experience of potential applicants.
The successful bidders are assigned all indigent criminal cases in the
superior courts, justice of the peace courts, juvenile courts, all appeals
in Mohave County, and all mental evaluations....
...No suggestion is made [in the bid letter] that counsel may
expect assistance in any way for support personnel. Any investigator,
paralegal, secretary, or similar personnel must be provided by the individual bidder who 87must also provide his own office space, equipment, and supplies.'
With one exception in the four years prior to the decision, the contract had gone to the lowest bidders, who divided equally the
caseload for the entire county. In 1982-83, the four low bids were
$24,000, $26,200, $34,300, and $34,400.188 In addition, representation could be part time, so that successful bidders could maintain
a private practice over and above their contract commitments.1 8 9 In
Smith, defense counsel in eleven months had handled 149 felonies,
160 misdemeanors, 21 juvenile cases, and 33 other proceedings.
He also maintained a private civil practice, and handled all appointment cases of a local municipality. 190
The Arizona Supreme Court compared this system with one
proposed by the NLADA and, not surprisingly, found it inadequate.
182

140 Ariz. 355, 681 P.2d 1374 (1984).

183
184
185
186

Id. at 362, 681 P.2d at 1381.
Id. at 364, 681 P.2d at 1383.
860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988).

187

Smith, 140 Ariz. at 360, 681 P.2d at 1379.
360, 681 P.2d at 1379.

Id. at 1018.

188 Id. at
189 Id.
190

Id. at 361, 681 P.2d at 1380.
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It was lacking in four respects: it failed to take into account the
complexity of individual cases; it failed to provide support services,
such as investigators and law clerks; it failed to consider the competency of attorneys who submitted bids; and it failed to reflect the
time an attorney should be expected to spend representing the indigent. In studied understatement, the court concluded that this system "militates against adequate assistance" to such a degree that it
violated the sixth amendment.19 1
This conclusion, given the record before the court, was hardly
surprising. Of particular interest, however, was the fact that the
court reached this conclusion despite its determination that counsel
in Smith had been minimally effective.
The fact that one felony defendant out of 149 felony defendants was
given minimum adequate representation does not mean that others
were properly represented. The insidiousnessof overburdeningdefense counsel is that it can result in concealingfrom the courts, andparticularlythe appellate

courts, the nature and extent
of damage that is done to defendants by their attor92
neys' excessive caseloads.1
In other words, the fact that a defendant cannot predict with certainty before trial that his attorney will be ineffective does not validate the system, nor does it require that a reviewing court wait until
a verdict is reached in an individual case before granting relief. By
extension, the system would be no less flawed if the defendant in
any particular case were acquitted, as some no doubt are. Systemic
conditions, wholly apart from the competence of individual counsel,
render the proceedings sufficiently suspect to justify a presumption
that a conviction is unconstitutional. Without regard to particular
cases, the presumption of correctness has been replaced with a presumption of incorrectness.
Doctrinally, Smith is without question incorrect. The error,
however, is not that it goes too far by creating a presumption of
illegitimacy, but that it does not go far enough. The discussion in
Smith, if it revealed anything, documented the pervasive defects in
the defense of indigents in Mohave County, Arizona. The danger,
as the Arizona Supreme Court correctly observed, is not what happens in a particular case as a result of resource deprivation; in any
given case counsel may somehow manage to be minimally effective,
despite the burdens under which he or she operates. Rather, the
danger is what resource deprivation prevents defense counsel from
accomplishing in any number of other cases.' 9 3 From that perspec191 Id. at 362, 681 P.2d at 1381.
192 State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 362, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1984) (emphasis added).
193 In this respect, the analogy to Holloway is particularly appropriate: "[I]n a case of
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tive, the state has subjected random defendants to the constructive
denial of counsel, which of course is no less a violation than had the
state actually denied counsel. 19 4 Any inquiry into prejudice in such
19 5
a case is unnecessary.
Yet the result in Smith calls for precisely this inquiry. By grafting a rebuttable presumption of incorrectness onto each case, the
Arizona Supreme Court subjects the systemic defects in Mohave
County to a harmless error analysis.' 9 6 That is, just as in the harmless error cases, the outcome is presumptively incorrect, subject to
rebuttal by the state that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 7 Harmless error, however, has no place where the
flaw is pervasive or where its effect cannot be isolated from the remainder of the case.' 9 8 Yet this is precisely what happened in Mohave County: "The insidiousness of overburdening defense counsel
is that it can result in concealing from the courts, and particularly
the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that is done to
defendants."'' 9 9 The flaw in any particular case can neither be identified from the appellate record nor isolated from the larger systemic condition of which it is a product. This necessarily precludes
application of the harmless error doctrine.
joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in what the
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing .. " Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (emphasis in original). Resource deprivation presents precisely the
same "evil."
194 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 599 (1989) (" '[a]ctual or constructive denial of the
assistance of counsel altogether' ... is not subject to the kind of prejudice analysis that is
appropriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's performance itself has been
constitutionally ineffective") (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692
(1984)).
195 Id.
196 The harmless error analysis is essentially an inquiry into prejudice, because it presupposes that a certain measure of constitutional error is tolerable in the trial of a criminally accused, as long as it does not influence the jury's verdict. The difference is in the
allocation of burdens: in the Stricklandprejudice inquiry, the defendant must show prejudice, while in the harmless error analysis, the state must show its absence.
197 The Arizona Supreme Court unfortunately neglected to indicate what showing by
the state would be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. When the error is of federal constitutional dimension,
however, the state must show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Court in Smith made it clear that the
systemic defects in the Mohave County system of indigent defense violated the sixth
amendment. State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 362, 681 P.2d 1372, 1381 (1984); the Chapman standard is therefore appropriate.
198 See e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 49091 ('.In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial
and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with
some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury.").
199 Smith, 140 Ariz. at 362, 681 P.2d at 1381.
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What the Arizona Supreme Court should have done in Smith,
and what is done whenever a reviewing court identifies a pervasive
systemic condition which violates the right to effective assistance of
counsel, 20 0 is order prospective, systemic relief from the offending
condition. No defendant charged in Mohave County should be
prosecuted subject to the disadvantages imposed by these conditions, just as no defendant could be defended by counsel laboring
under an actual conflict of interest. What the Court in Smith should
have done, in other words, is recognize the violation for what it isan example of system ineffectiveness, requiring the same response
as any system ineffectiveness case.
Smith arose in the context of a criminal appeal. In Luckey, the
plaintiff-appellants were a bilateral class of all indigent persons
either presently charged, or who will be charged, with a criminal
offense in Georgia, and of all attorneys who represent or who will
represent indigent defendants in the state.2 0 1 Plaintiffs alleged that
"systemic deficiencies" in the Georgia defense system, "including
inadequate resources, delays in the appointment of counsel, pressure on attorneys to hurry their clients' case to trial or to enter a
guilty plea, and inadequate supervision in the Georgia indigent
criminal defense system" deprive criminal defendants of their right
to the effective assistance of counsel. 20 2 The trial court had dismissed for failure to state a claim under the sixth amendment, ruling
that because plaintiffs could not prove "an across-the-board future
inevitably of ineffective assistance," they could not satisfy Strickland,
and therefore could not prevail. 20 3 The Eleventh Circuit
20 4
reversed.
Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, although
absolutely correct in its result, was cursory and confused in its analysis. It began with a statement of the rule in Strickland and then observed that "[t]his standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking
prospective relief." 20 5 Instead, the plaintiff's burden is to show "the
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the
inadequacy of remedies at law." 20 6 But this quote from O'Shea v.
200 See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2771 (1989); Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 868 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201 Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1988).
202 Id. Plaintiffs also raised eighth and fourteenth amendment claims, though the
Eleventh Circuit considered the case only on sixth amendment grounds. Id. at 1016 n. 1.
203 Id.
204 Id.

at 1016-17.

205 Id. at 1017.
206 Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1988) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
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Littleton applies to the showing necessary for article III standing to
seek injunctive relief; it has no application whatever to the claim that
systemic deficiencies in indigent defense constitute ineffective assistance. The latter claim is not a matter of article III justiciability, but
20 7
of sixth amendment jurisprudence.
This confusion between standing under article III and viability
under the sixth amendment echoes the prior confusion by the district court. It too had conflated the sixth amendment claim, erroneously viewing it as a Strickland issue, with the likelihood of future
injury (standing). Presumably, both courts were struggling with the
dual observations that plaintiffs could not state with certainty that
defense counsel would be ineffective in any individual case and that
ineffective assistance claims (meaning attorney incompetence) are
typically raised after trial.
As to the first matter, a certainty of future harm is not an essential part of a system ineffectiveness claim. Rather, the question in
any system claim is whether the systemic condition threatens to undermine the adversarial process. This was the plaintiff's allegation.
What the court of appeals lacked, and what this Article provides, is
the vehicle to distinguish between attorney ineffectiveness and system ineffectiveness. Strickland provides the applicable standard for
the former, and requires a showing of prejudice in each case. Powell,
Wade, Herringand other system cases address the latter and give rise
to at least a presumption of prejudice. Plaintiff's allegations were
quintessential system ineffectiveness allegations. Strickland, therefore, simply had no relevance to the litigation; Strickland has no relevance to any system ineffectiveness claim.
As to the second issue-whether the claim can be raised at the
pretrial stage-the Eleventh Circuit did cite a number of system ineffectiveness cases for the proposition that "[t]he sixth amendment
protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus deficiencies that do not meet the 'ineffectiveness' [attorney incompetence] standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's right under
the sixth amendment. '20 8 With this, the court appeared to recognize the difference between system and attorney ineffectiveness by
207 This is not to suggest that plaintiffs in Luckey are without justiciability problems.
On the contrary, the problems are considerable, as suggested elsewhere. See infra notes
215 through 250 and accompanying text. The point remains, however, that article III
justiciability is a distinct concept, raising entirely different concerns from viability under
the sixth amendment. Moreover, to conclude that the claim is without merit under the
sixth amendment would potentially foreclose litigation in any forum, including a criminal appeal, as in Smith. A ruling on article III justiciability, however, affects only access
to the federal courts.
208 Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017.
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alluding to the competing views of a fair trial-one which observes
rigorous adversarial testing on the one hand, and one which produces a reliable result on the other. From these cases, the court
concluded that plaintiff's claims could be raised prospectively. 20 9
While correct, this conclusion obscures the reason for the result. It is not, as the court seemed to indicate, because plaintiff sued
for prospective relief; plaintiffs are not entitled to prospective relief
merely because they sue for it. The reason they were entitled to prospective relief is that they alleged system ineffectiveness, which as
210
Holloway makes most clear, may be raised at the pretrial stage.
Unfortunately, the decision shows no indication that the court understood the critical distinction between the two classes of cases; in
system claims the defect threatens to undermine the trial process
and thus must be raised before trial. Otherwise, the proceeding becomes a mere formality. Even if raised after trial, relief in future
cases attaches before the trial takes place to prevent additional defendants from being subject to the unconstitutional condition. In
attorney cases, by contrast, the system is presumed to be operating
correctly; nothing need be corrected before trial because there has
as yet been no defect.
These two cases, Smith and Luckey, illustrate the two most obvious applications of an ineffective assistance claim based on resource
deprivation. Smith arises out of a criminal appeal challenging a particular conviction, while Luckey is a civil rights action on behalf of an
entire class of current and punitive defendants. Both cases, however, raise substantial justiciability hurdles. Unfortunately, neither
the Arizona Supreme Court in Smith nor the Eleventh Circuit in
Luckey negotiated these hurdles and they remain stumbling blocks in
the path of any future application of the claim. A thorough treatment of the justiciability problems must wait for another article.
However, some discussion is appropriate now, at least to describe
the difficulties.
In Smith, the court sua sponte raised the problem of prospective
ineffective assistance.2 1' There is no indication from the opinion
that the defendant ever raised the matter, or even perceived it to be
a problem. Assuming other defendants are not inclined to wait until
a reviewing court takes it upon itself to address the problem of resource deprivation in indigent defense, the question becomes how a
Id. at 1018.
210 Id.; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
211 State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 360-64, 681 P.2d 1374, 1379-82 (1984).
209
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particular defendant can raise the matter before trial and achieve
the same result.
Holloway and Cuyler provide only a partial answer. The Holloway
Court recognized that defense counsel is in the best position to
identify the conflict of interest threatening the defendant's right to a
fair trial. Counsel, then, must raise the claim before the court. If
the judge fails to inquire, or inquires but nonetheless fails to resolve
the conflict, reversal is automatic, without regard to the facts of a
particular case or the possible absence of prejudice. 21 2 The Cuyler
Court in turn emphasized that multiple representation is not per se
unconstitutional; it may in fact be advantageous. Should defense
counsel fail to raise the conflict, the reviewing court, as with any
claim of attorney irieffectiveness, will presume the system operated
as it should and require the defendant prove that the error "affected" the representation. 2 13 In practice, this requires that the defendant prove prejudice.
Likewise, it is defense counsel who can best identify the resource deprivation threatening to undermine the adversarial process. He or she must raise the matter before the trial. As with
Holloway, defense counsel must show how the systemic condition impairs or threatens to impair his or her ability to put the state to its
proof. If the judge fails to inquire, or inquires but fails to resolve
the defect, reversal is once again automatic.
The unfortunate limitation to this approach is that it proceeds
on a case-by-case basis. Defendant A must attempt to make the
equivalent showing before trial as Defendant B. This, in turn, raises
two problems. The first problem is an overburdened defense counsel. Any response to this problem which requires an additional
hearing in every case is hardly calculated to alleviate that problem.
The relief afforded in Smith avoids this objection by creating the presumption that each defendant has already made the necessary showing. This once again, however, invites the question of how a
particular defendant could secure the same relief. Here Holloway
and Cuyler provide no answer, and this reveals the second limitation
to the case-by-case approach.
It is axiomatic that a party cannot, as a rule, assert the claims of
others. Thus, while Holloway entitles Defendant A to a pretrial hearing, his proofs will be limited to the defect as it affects him. Defendant
A can assert that he will be prejudiced by an overburdened defense
system, but manifestly, he lacks standing to assert Defendant B's
212 Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489.
213 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
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claim. Because the problem in Defendant A's case, in its particular
expression, 2 14 may be different than the problem in Defendant B's
case, it is improbable that a particular defendant could raise the issue of resource deprivation in a way that would provide the relief
granted in Smith. In that respect, Smith is an anamolous response to
a sua sponte decision by a state high court, not likely to be repeated in
the context of individual challenges to particular convictions.
Therein lies the appeal of Luckey. As a class action, it provides
class-wide relief. There is an obvious and satisfactory symmetry and
efficiency to attacking a systemic defect with an institutional remedy.
Plaintiffs seek precisely that: a declaration that the entire system of
indigent criminal defense in Georgia deprives defendants of their
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. But this claim for classwide relief faces its own justiciability hurdle-the problem of article
III standing to sue for injunctive relief after City of Los Angeles v.
2 15
Lyons.
Lyons is the infamous California chokehold case.2 16 For the first
time, the United States Supreme Court analyzed standing for injunctive relief entirely apart from standing for damages.2 17 The
facts in Lyons are outrageous, but straightforward: Los Angeles police stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic violation. Lyons got out of
his car, and the police asked him to put his hands over his head,
which he did. 2 18 One officer frisked him, and when he was done,

Lyons lowered his arms. An officer then grabbed his hands and
slammed them into Lyons' head. Lyons complained that he was in
pain; the officer responded by applying a chokehold. 2 19 The officer
choked Lyons to unconsciousness. When Lyons regained consciousness, he was on the ground spitting up blood. He had also
urinated and defecated. 22 0 The police gave him a ticket for driving
214 Though the umbrella problem in all cases is resource deprivation, the particular

expression of this problem may--and in fact, would be expected to-vary from case to
case. Thus, in one case, the problem may be that defense counsel cannot conduct essential fact investigation. In the next case, it may be that counsel cannot conduct legal
research, or meet with his client enough to prepare an adequate alibi defense. The variations are virtually infinite, though all relate to and are caused by the fundamental systemic condition of resource deprivation. The point in the text is simply that if the
problem in Defendant A's case is that counsel cannot conduct adequate fact investigation, counsel cannot alpo have the opportunity to show how Defendant B's case requires
more legal research. Let Defendant B do that for himself, counsel will be told.
215 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
216 For a partial list of the attacks on Lyons, see Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of
Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, n.3 (1987).
217 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 122-31 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 114.
219 Id. at 114-15.

220 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 115 (1983). Between 1975 and 1980,
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22 1
with a broken taillight and released him.

The Supreme Court held that Lyons lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.2 22 An injunction is a prospective remedy. As such, it

is appropriate relief only for those who will encounter the offending
condition in the future. Those who have been victims of the unconstitutional conduct may sue for damages, as Lyons did, and there
was no dispute he had standing to press his damages claim. However, without the assurance of future injury, Lyons' claim presented
only a speculative threat of harm, just as it would be for any person
living or traveling in the city. Lyons, therefore, lacked the "live interest" necessary for standing. He was no more entitled to injunc223
tive relief than any other citizen of Los Angeles.
Applied to Lyons, standing to sue for injunctive relief had two
components.. He had to allege first, that he would again encounter
the police, and second, that the police would again subject him to.
the unconstitutional chokehold. This would establish the necessary
connection between the relief sought and the harm suffered. 224 To
meet this test, Lyons needed:
not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either, (1) that all police
officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they hapthe
City ordered or authorized
pen to have an encounter.., or (2) that 22
5
police officers to act in such a manner.
With this holding, the Court seemed to require a "virtual certainty" of future injury before a plaintiff had standing to sue for injunctive relief.2 26 The Court noted that Lyons had to allege that he

"will be" stopped by the police again. In addition; the Court required Lyons to show that "strangleholds are applied by the Los
Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested .... "227 Of
course, Lyons could never make this showing, and his case was
228
dismissed.
the Los Angeles police had applied chokeholds on at least 975 occasions. At least 16
people had died as a result of the chokeholds. Id. at 115-16.
221

Id. at 115.

Id. at 100-01. Only the decision to issue the injunction was litigated on appeal.
The damages claim was not before the Court.
222

223
224

Id. at 111.
Id. at 105-06.

225
226
227

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (emphasis in original).
See Fisher, supra note 216, at 1092, 1097, n.108.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.7, 108. On the other hand, other parts of the opinion

suggest a more tolerant approach: "Lyons would have to credibly allege that he faced a
realistic threat .... Lyons' standing ... depended on whether he was likely to suffer
" Id. at 105.
future injury ....
228

Id. at 100.
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Clearly, Lyons has the potential to change the entire legal landscape regarding injunctive relief. Professor Tribe demonstrates that
if applied strictly, Lyons leads to the conclusion that the plaintiffs in
both Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke2 29 and Roe v. Wade2 30 lacked
standing. 23 ' He might well have added Gerstein v. Pugh,23 2 and every
condition of confinement case. As applied to system ineffectiveness,
no plaintiff would have standing to challenge systemic conditions of
representation because none could demonstrate they would again
be a defendant, nor could they guarantee that in their case counsel
233
would be ineffective.
Luckey made no mention of Lyons. In fact, the entire discussion
of standing in Luckey was contained in a single sentence. 234 But Lyons cannot be easily ignored. If applied as written, Lyons virtually
assures that the plaintiffs in Luckey lack standing. That, however, is
the problem with Lyons-the case proves too much. Without so
much as a word, the Court would have rewritten vast bodies of substantive law by disallowing standing to challenge unconstitutional
conditions of relatively brief duration. Fortunately, an examination
of other Supreme Court cases suggests that in all likelihood, the
Court did not intend so strict a reading.
The decision most closely related is Gerstein. In Gerstein, the
plaintiff-respondents were three defendants arrested and charged in
Dade County, Florida. 23 5 Under the procedures in place, criminal
229 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
230 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
231 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 114-17 (1985). Bakke could not demonstrate
that he would be admitted to a subsequent class, and the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade could
not demonstrate that she would again become pregnant and again want an abortion.
232 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Jail and prison condition litigation necessarily presumes
some prior "encounter" with 'the police. If the plaintiff in Lyons could not predict with
certainty another encounter, then by implication neither can any inmate. See also O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) ("We assume that respondents will conduct their
activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to
the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners.").
233 In some respects, the jail condition litigation remains a better case for injunctive
relief than the claim of prospective ineffective assistance, since in the jail suits, plaintiffs
can guarantee that certain unconstitutional conditions, for example overcrowding, will
affect every inmate. The same cannot be said here, for as noted at the outset of this
Article, it may well be that despite the systemic lack of resources, some defendants will
receive minimally adequate representation.
234 [W]e conclude that appellants' allegations that they are presently being denied
constitutional rights as a direct result of the failure of appellees to furnish counsel
in a manner that meets minimum constitutional standards is sufficient to satisfy the
Article III requirement of an allegation that they have sustained or are immediately
in danger of sustaining some "real and immediate injury" resulting from challenged
official conduct. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1016 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
235 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
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defendants could be charged and detained for substantial periods,
often over a month, without a judicial determination of probable
cause.2 3 6 The respondents brought a class action in federal district
court, alleging that the extended detention without a judicial hearing on probable cause constituted a violation of their rights under
the sixth and fourth imendments.2 37 Their complaint sought de2 38
claratory and injunctive relief.
Neither party in Gerstein raised the standing issue. At oral argument, however, the Court learned that the named respondents had
been convicted, and that their pretrial detention had ended.2 39 Because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, Lyons suggests that
standing depended on whether an injunction would be effectivefor
them. To make the necessary showing, they would have to allege the
following: 1) that they would again be arrested, charged, and detained; and 2) that again there would be a delay in the judicial determination of probable cause.2 40 Because the plaintiffs could not
make that showing, Lyons would require dismissal.
The Court did not dismiss the claim, nor did it require any certainty of recurrence. "Pretrial detention," the Court wrote,
is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual
could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is
either released or convicted. The individualcould nonetheless suffer repeated
deprivations, and it is certain that otherpersons similarly situated will be detained
24
under the allegedly unconstitutionalprocedures. 1
Apparently, at least at the time of Gerstein, the prospect that the
plaintiff "could . . . suffer repeated deprivations" was enough to
grant standing to sue for injunctive relief.2 42 And if Lyons means
what it says, the procedural portion of Gerstein must be bad law.
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id. at 106.

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1975).
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 110 n.ll.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983).
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.l 1 (emphasis added).
The fact that Gerstein was a class action does not change this conclusion. In a class
action, a named plaintiff must have standing both at the time the complaint is filed, and,
in most cases, when the class is certified. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975);
Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1456 (11th Cir. 1984). In Gerstein, the Court acknowledged that the record did not indicate whether the named plaintiffs had standing when
the district court certified the class, thus throwing the second requirement of Sosna in
doubt. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.ll (1975). Ordinarily, this would render
the case moot. Id.
But this case is a suitable exception to that requirement.... The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended at any time by
release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as well as by
acquittal or conviction after trial .... Moreover, in this case the constantexistence of a class
ofpersons suffering the deprivationis certain. The attorney representingthe named respondents is
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But if Gerstein is bad law, then the Court cannot explain Schall v.
Martin.243 Schall was decided the term after Lyons and relied on Gerstein in reaching the merits of another pretrial detention claim. 24 4 In

Schall, plaintiff-appellees brought a class action on behalf of all
juveniles detained pursuant to a New York statute authorizing pretrial detention in a certain class of cases. 24 5 The district court struck
down the statute, the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme
24 6
Court reversed.
At the start of the opinion, now-Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
in a footnote that "the pretrial detention of the class representatives
has long since ended .... *247 The case was not moot, however,
because " '[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary .... The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under the
allegedly unconstitutional procedures.' "248
Apparently, the risk that an individual "could... suffer" future
injury remains the standard, at least in pretrial detention litigation.
a public defender, and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live
interest in the case.

Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, under the class of cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
the Court relaxed the usual requirement that a plaintiff have standing at the time of class
certification. Id. This has obvious implications for the claim discussed in this case, since
the quoted portion describes the plaintiffs in our hypothetical public defender office to
perfection.
However, the Court did not relax the first requirement in Sosna: the plaintiff must
have standing at the time the complaint was filed. Therefore, the point in the text remains valid since, under Lyons, the plaintiffs in Gerstein simply would not have had standing for injunctive relief.
243 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
244 Id. at 256 n.3. The plaintiffs in Schall did not seek an injunction. They did, however, seek declaratory relief, as did Lyons. To the extent both injunctive and declaratory
relief are prospective, the connection between the risk of future injury and the relief
sought remains the same. If a plaintiff must show he will again be subject to the unconstitutional conduct before he can argue for injunctive relief, he should have to make the
equivalent showing before he can argue for declaratory relief. The Seventh Circuit recently relied on Lyons to dismiss two claims, one for injunctive and one for declaratory
relief. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 966, n.5 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (per curiam); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,
108-10 (1969); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1421-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
484 U.S. 935 (1987).
245 Schall, 467 U.S. at 255-56. Pretrial detention was authorized if the court found
there was a "serious risk" that the juvenile "may before the return date commit an act
which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." Id. at 255 (citing N.Y. JUD.
LAw § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983)).
246 Id. at 256.
247 Id. at 256 n.3.
248

Id. (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110, n.ll (1975)).
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Notably, the Court in Schall never mentioned Lyons. 24 9 Under this
more relaxed standard, article III standing in Luckey is considerably
less problematic.
Thus, while the issue of standing has not yet surfaced in the
249 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 (1984). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1983) (decided the same day as Lyons). In Kolender, the. Court struck down a statute
which required a suspect to identify himself with "credible and reliable" identification
when stopped and questioned by the police. The plaintiff, who had been stopped approximately 15 times under the statute, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at
354, 356.
In a footnote, the Court dispensed with the standing issue: "We note that Lawson
has been stopped on approximately 15 occasions ... and that these 15 stops occurred in
a period of less than two years. Thus, there is a "credible threat" that Lawson might be detained
again under [the statute]." Id. at 355 n.3 (emphasis added).
Kolender simply cannot be reconciled with Lyons. Under Lyons, Lawson would have
to allege "not only ... that he would have another encounter with the police but also to
make the incredible assertion either, (1) that all police officers in [the geographic area]
.... always [demand 'credible and reliable' identification] ... or (2) that the City ordered
or authorized police officers to act in such manner." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (emphasis in original).
Yet Lawson was not required to make this showing. Rather, because he alleged a
"credible threat" that he would suffer future injury, he had standing to challenge the
statute. Again, the Court in Kolender made no mention of Lyons.
Other post-Lyons decisions confirm that the Court could not have intended a strict
reading of the decision. In INS v. Delgado, 446 U.S. 210 (1984), plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the INS practice of entering factories to question workers and search for illegal
aliens. The complaint alleged the existence of a policy which violated the fourth amendment, and which would be applied to them in their workplace in the future. However,
the plaintiffs had no evidence to substantiate the claim that they were at risk for future
injury. Id. at 217 n.4. Under Lyons, this clearly did not provide standing for injunctive
relief, yet the Court found standing, and decided the case on the merits. Id.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986), likewise demonstrates the reluctance to apply Lyons with rigor. In Press-Enterprise,the Court considered
the first amendment claim of a newspaper to the transcripts of a preliminary hearing in a
criminal prosecution. The trial court had sealed the transcript, and the newspaper challenged the ruling. While the case was being litigated, the criminal defendant waived his
right to ajury trial and the trial court released the transcript. Id. at 5. In his opinion for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that since the transcript had been released, the petitioner had already won the relief it sought. Id. at 6. A rule restricting a
trial court from sealing preliminary hearing transcripts, therefore, at least under Lyons,
would be effective for the petitioner only if it could show that: 1) it would again seek a
preliminary hearing transcript; and 2) that a judge would again determine that the defendant's right to a fair trial outweighed the public's right of access.
The Court required no such showing. On the contrary, "[iut can reasonably be assumed
that petitioner will be subjected to a similar closure order and, because criminal proceedings are typically of short duration, such an order will likely evade review." Id.
(emphasis added). On this basis, the Court proceeded to the merits. Id. See also
Fisher, supra note 216, at 103-04, for a discussion of other first amendment cases where
the Court found standing despite the absence of certainty of future injury. As Professor
Fisher recognizes, the Court is particularly quick to protect free speech, which makes a
lesser standard appropriate. Id. But a more relaxed approach to the threat of future
injury is not limited to first amendment cases, as Delgado, Kolender, and Schall
demonstrate.
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court opinions in Luckey, the question of standing clearly is raised by
a case like Luckey. Focusing on Lyons, moreover, should not be interpreted as suggesting that standing to secure injunctive relief is the
only justiciability problem raised by litigation similar to Luckey. Another possible obstacle is federal court abstention based on Younger
v. Harris.2 50 These problems are not fatal to a Luckey-type claim; a
discussion explicating why these justicibility problems are surmountable, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to address the simple, but troubling
and important inquiry into the proper response to systemic resource
deprivation in indigent defense. The answer requires a proper understanding of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. It is
clear that the interest protected is the right to a fair trial.
The complicating factor in this simple observation is the failure
by the Supreme Court to distinguish clearly between two distinct
types of ineffective assistance. All ineffective assistance jurisprudence divides into two sets of cases: system ineffectiveness and attorney ineffectiveness. In the latter, ineffective assistance is the
result of the failings of individual counsel. 25 ' In system ineffectiveness, by contrast, ineffective assistance is the result of systemic con25 2
ditions, quite apart from the conduct of individual counsel.
Because each condition produces the same constitutional defect-an unfair trial-the Court describes them both as ineffective
assistance. This is what causes the confusion, because the two are
fundamentally distinct. Attorney ineffectiveness is caused by mistakes on the part of individual counsel. The system which produced
the conviction is otherwise presumed to have operated correctly. It
is presumed, in other words, to have produced a reliable result. The
defendant who raises this claim must overcome this presumption by
demonstrating that the errors of counsel undermine the reliability
of the result. He or she must prove prejudice. Relief extends no
further than the case before the court and leads to no systemic
changes in the trial process because by definition the trial process
was not at fault.
System ineffectiveness, on the other hand, is definitionally separate from the performance of individual counsel. It is caused not by
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
252 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
250
251
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the conduct of counsel, but by systemic conditions that pervade and
undermine the trial process. A failure to appoint counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding, for instance, threatens to reduce. the
trial itself to a mere formality, irrespective of the competence of
counsel. Because the system is under attack, the presumption of
correctness has no application.
Seen from this vantage, it is apparent that resource deprivation,
like any other systemic defect, is a state created condition operating
wholly independently of the competence of individual counsel. Like
any other systemic defect, it prevents defense counsel from subjecting the state's case to the crucible of adversarial testing. The attorney's appointment is reduced to a mere sham, destroying the
integrity of the process. Relief, as in every system ineffectiveness
case, must be prospective and systemic. The state simply cannot,
consistent with the sixth amendment, subject defendants to these
crisis conditions. The law would not tolerate positive prohibitions
on the defendant's right to "the guiding hand of counsel." The law
cannot allow indirectly what it would never tolerate directly.

